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GO WORLD

JULY-AUGUST 1979 NO. 14

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The Kato juggernaut rolls on — Kato defeats Rin in the fifth game of the 34th Honinbo title match.

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Front cover: An illustration from a popular prewar magazine.

Back cover: Part of the pattern on a formal kimono. The westernisation of Japanese dress in the postwar period has made the use of go as a decorative motif in clothing extremely rare, but apparently it was not uncommon before the war. Both examples are from the Narita Collection.

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GO WORLD NEWS

Kato Defends Honinbo Title

Kato Masao is having yet another good year. Immediately after defending his Judan title at the cost of just one lost game he duplicated this feat in the 34th Honinbo title match, repulsing the challenger, Rin Kaiho, by a convincing 4-1 margin. Rin ruefully admitted after the end of the series that he was completely outplayed. Actually the crucial turning point was the fourth game. Rin, in byo-yomi, was convinced that he had a half-point win, so it was quite a shock to him to find that although the margin was correct, his opponent was the victor.

Rin's sole victory came in the second game, in which Kato misread a life-and-death problem in a corner and so resigned on the 89th move. Kato thus created an unenviable record, for this was the first two-day game in modern go history to end on the first day. However, he took this setback in his stride and swept the next three games straight. With Kato in such good form, there is no telling how long the Kato dynasty will last. His target for successive Honinbo titles is the nine terms of Takagawa, with Sakata's seven and Ishida's five to pass on the way.

The results:

Game 1 (May 24, 25). Kato (B) won by resignation.

Game 2 (June 5). Rin(B) won by resig.

Game 3 (June 13, 14). Kato (B) won by resig.

Game 4 (June 28,29). Kato (W) won by ½ point.

Game 5 (July 9, 10). Kato (B) won by resig.

Note. Sakata Eio retained his place in the Hon-

inbo league by defeating Kudo Norio on the 14th June.

Sakata Shares Lead with Takemiya in the Meijin League

After leading all the way in the 4th Meijin league, Takemiya Masaki stumbled within sight of the finishing post, losing his 7th round game on the 19th July to Sakata Eio. This changes the whole complexion of the league, for with only one round to go, not only does Sakata move into the lead with Takemiya but also Rin and Kato, both with three losses each, now have an outside chance. At the other end of the league, former Meijin, Ishida, who is having a dismal year, drops out of the league, together with Ushinohama, and will be joined by either Yamashiro or Cho.


Cho Chikun Wins Gosei Title

Cho Chikun 8-dan, the twenty-three year old Korean professional, has won his fourth title by defeating Otake Meijin 3-0 in the 4th Gosei title. Cho made a good start by scoring four straight wins in the Gosei league, then went on to outplay a rather lacklustre Otake, whose poor form does not bode well for his Meijin defence this autumn. Winning this title puts an end to a one and a half year blank in Cho's title career, but the win which probably meant the most to him was the one against Sakata in the league. Even since his upset loss to Sakata in the 22nd Nihon Ki-in Championship in 1974, Cho has been unable to

4th Meijin League (as of 10th August)

Rank	Name	R	K	S	C	H	I	U	T	Y	Score
1	Rin	—	1	0	1	1		1	0	0	4-3
2	Kato	0	—	0		1	1	1	1		4-2
3	Sakata	1	1	—	1		1	0	1	0	5-2
4	Cho	0		0	—	0	1	0		1	2-4
5	Hashimoto	0	0		1	—	1	1	0	1	4-3
6	Ishida		0	0	0	0	—	1	0	1	2-5
7	Ushinohama	0	0	1	1	0	0	—	0	0	2-6
7	Takemiya	1	0	0		1	1	1	—	1	5-2
7	Yamashiro	1		1	0	0	0	1	0	—	3-4

Note: the players are ranked according to their results in the previous league.



Cho Chikun finally overcomes the Sakata-jinx in their Gosei league game.

beat Sakata, losing a total of twelve games straight. A jinx like this is probably unique in modern go, so Cho must be very relieved indeed at putting an end to it.

4th Kisei Tournament Progress

The 1st stage of the 4th Kisei tournament has now been concluded, with Sakai Takeshi defeating Kobayashi Koichi to win the 8-dan championship, and Rin Kaiho getting the better of Ishii Kunio in the 9-dan final. The second stage, a complicated knockout tournament among the first stage dan-winners, is also well advanced, with Rin and Ishii Kunio having reached the quarter-finals. The early star of the second stage was Kobayashi Satoru 5-dan, who won three games in a row before bowing to Ishii 9-dan.

European News

1979 German Champion

In the 1979 German championship, held in early June, first place was taken by Bernd Wolter 4-dan, who thus became the German representative in the 2nd World Amateur Go Championship. Second was Michael Kitsos 4-dan (the 1977 champion) and third was Horst Kippe 4-dan (the 1978 champion). All three players are from Berlin.

1979 Hamburg Affensprung Tournament

The richest tournament in Europe is Hamburg's Affensprung (sarusuberi or monkey jump) tournament. This five-round Swiss tournament, open to players 3-dan and over, is held at Pentecost, which this year was the 2nd to the 4th June, and the first prize of DM1000 usually attracts a very strong field (the entry fee is DM20). The place-getters, with prize-money, were:

1st (DM1000): Robert Rehm 4-dan (Hol.) (5-0)
2nd (DM500): Wolfgang Isele 5-dan (W. Germany) (4-1)

3rd (DM250): Max Rebattu 5-dan (Hol.) (4-1)

4th: Cas Muller 4-dan (Hol.) (DM200 prize for best 4-dan)

5th: Thomas Jipp 3-dan (W. Germany) (DM 100 prize for best 3-dan)

6th: Jurgen Mattem 6-dan (W. Germany)

7th: Katscher 5-dan (W. Germany)

8th: Stefan Budig 3-dan (W. Germany)

4th International Go Tournament in Berlin

The 4th International Go Tournament, a five-round Swiss, will be held in Berlin from the 2nd to the 4th November this year. The entry fee for this even game tournament is DM15 (students DM7.50) and applications should be forwarded to:

4th International Go Tournament Berlin

c/o Dietmar Hartung

Arndtstr. 13, 1000 Berlin 61

F. R. Germany (Tel. 030 691 30 31 Mon-Fri 15 - 18.00)

The tournament venue is:

Haus der Jugend, Berlin-Charlottenburg

Zillestrasse 54, Berlin 10

The subway station is Deutsche Oper.

1979 Yugoslav Championship

The 1st Yugoslav Championship was held from the 3rd to the 8th July this year and the winner, with six points out of seven, was Mutabzija 5-dan, who will represent Yugoslavia in the 1980 world amateur championship. Second place (5 points) was shared by Ekart 4-dan, Petrovic 3-dan and Bizjak 5-dan. Equal 5th (4 points) were Pecenko and Suc, both 4-dan, and Ninkovic and Kuhar, both 3-dan.

8th Elsevier International Tournament

The 8th Elsevier International Tournament, sponsored by Elsevier Publishing Company, was held at the Sportal Oost (Sporthall East) in Amsterdam from the 24th to the 27th May. The tournament is a six-round, even game Swiss and this year it attracted a record turn-out for Europe of 174 participants from eight countries. The winner of the top division (3-dan and up) was a dark horse, Rob van Zeijst 3-dan of Holland, with 5 wins. Other place-getters in the top division were:

2nd (5 points): Max Rebattu 5-dan (Holland)

3rd (4): Tony Goddard 5-dan (England), Jerome Hubert 3-dan (France), Cas Muller 4-dan (Holland), Ronald Schlemper 5-dan (Holland)

British Group Tours China

In May this year a group of British go players, led by Stuart Dowsey, publicity officer of the B.G.A., toured China for 13 days as guests of the Chinese Weiqi (Wei-ch'i) Association. The group played goodwill matches in Peking, Hangchow, Shanghai and Canton. This tour returned the courtesy for the well-received visit by three top Chinese players to the London Open Congress at the New Year. It was probably the first such goodwill tour by western go players.

Toby Manning B.G.A. President

At the annual general meeting of the British Go Association, held on the 31st March this year, Toby Manning was elected president to replace the late Brian Castledine. Tim Hazelden and Matthew Macfadyen were reelected as treasurer and secretary respectively.

1979 Austrian Champion


The Austrian championship was held in early May and first place went to last year's Austrian and European champion, Helmut Hasibeder 5-dan who will represent Austria in the 1980 world championship. Second was Gerfried Beck and third Helmut Wiltschek.

2nd World Amateur Go Championship

Encouraged by the great success of the first championship, the Nihon Ki-in and Japan Air Lines are planning to hold the 2nd World Amateur Go Championship at the Nihon Ki-in in Tokyo from the 25th to the 29th March, 1980. The number of countries participating this time has been increased to twenty, with invitations being extended to the German Democratic Republic, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hong Kong to send representatives. It is also hoped that a representative from the U.S.S.R., which was originally scheduled to participate this year, will also take part.

Japanese Team Tours China

A team of eight Japanese professionals, led by Okubo Ichigen 9-dan, toured China from the 7th to the 27th June and discovered that Chinese go is gaining new depth and strength. The team just managed to come out ahead in its official matches, with 22 wins, 21 losses and 5 jigo, but this is the closest the Chinese have come to defeating a touring Japanese team. More significant, however, is the fact that the Japanese found that their opponents are getting younger and younger each tour. Kobayashi Satoru, for example, at twenty one of the bright hopes of the Japanese go scene,



Great Wall of China breached by British group – playing go are Geoffrey Gray (of Australia) and James Bates, with John McLeod, Frank Pratt and Brian Dakombe watching (L to R) (Photo S. Dowsey)

was defeated by the fourteen year old Ma Hsiao-ch'un, a player of whom Nieh Wei-p'ing has been predicting great things for some time. A fifteen year old girl managed to get a jigo against former Japanese Women's Champion Kobayashi Chizu 5-dan, while a number of other players in their mid-teens also did well.

As for the senior players on the Chinese side, Nieh Wei-p'ing was his usual brilliant self, scoring four straight wins against Okubo, Shiraishi 9-dan, Hane 8-dan and Nakamura Shidehito 7-dan. The number three Chinese player, Hua I-kang, also did well, with 'wins in his two games against Okubo and Tokimoto 6-dan. The number two player, Ch'en Tsu-te, won against Shiraishi but lost to Okubo, while the top woman player, K'ung Shang-ming, once again beat Kobayashi Chizu.

The Japanese touring team also secured a scoop during their visit, for they brought back the news of the engagement of Nieh Wei-p'ing and K'ung

Continued on page 16

棋聖戦

Game Two

The first game of this title match had been a close-fought contest in which the challenger Ishida Yoshio had had a chance of winning, though this had come to nothing through a strategic misjudgement at a crucial juncture of the middle game. Ishida is notoriously a slow starter but all the same there was considerable pressure on him to keep the title-holder Fujisawa Shuko within his sights by winning the second game.

White: Ishida Yoshio, Oza

Black: Fujisawa Shuko, Kisei

komi: 5½; time: 9 hours each

date: 24th, 25th January, 1979

played in Toyama city




Figure 1 (1 – 49)

Figure 1 (1 – 49). A non-professional joseki

Ishida was the first to enter the playing room on the morning of the 24th. After taking his place, he began to wipe the go board carefully with the white cloth provided for the purpose. This kind of attention to detail, and more than that, to the traditional etiquette of go, is a feature of all the players of the Kitani school, a result of the rigorous training of the late Kitani Minoru.

White 4. Ishida's aim of course is to prevent Shuko from following his favourite Chinese-style fuseki. His continuation at 6 is not often seen,

3rd Kisei Title

however, as attaching next at 10 is most common. The sequence to 22 is a joseki which has just about disappeared from professional play in recent decades, though still popular among amateurs. The standard criticism of this joseki is that Black's profit outweighs White's thickness, especially in view of the large komi that White is burdened with nowadays.


White 30. Ishida thought about this move for thirty-nine minutes. Playing at 34 would let Black play the same pattern White played at the bottom left, thus simplifying the position, whereas the aim of 30 and the continuation at 32 is to complicate matters.

Black 33 is severe. Attaching at 1 in Dia. 1 is often seen but in this case the result is not good for Black, as White would take sente with 2 to 6, then switch to the top right with 8 to 12.


White 36 may seem slow but keeping Black's forces separated is essential.

White 40 is a tough answer to Black's invasion. Answering at 1 in Dia. 2 would be just what Black wants. White 3 and 5 make bad shape, so White could not play this way. Simply playing 3 at 5 is no good either – after Black 7, White 3, Black 'a', White could capture the corner stones, but the ponnuki would be ample compensation for Black.


Black 43, which prevents White from getting a ladder at 'a' after Black 49, is well-timed. White must extend at 44, as playing 1 in Dia. 3 would let Black make nice central thickness with 4, thus cancelling out White's thickness on the bottom right.



Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3





Figure 2 (50 - 80)

Figure 2 (50 - 80). *White goes on the attack.*

When White moves out with 50, the result to 59 is inevitable. White 1 in Dia. 4 is also a vital point, but Black takes too much profit in the sequence to 6, as well as getting an excellent sente move at 'a'.



Dia. 4

Dia. 5

White 52 may seem unnecessary but there is a good reason for this move. White is worried that if he simply pushed at 1 in Dia. 5, Black might switch to 2, setting in train the exchange to 6. This result seems a little favourable for Black, so White plays 52 to deprive him of this option.

Black 57 is crucial, as letting White play there would immediately reduce Black's liberties. Black 59 next makes good shape, following the proverb, 'play at the centre of three stones'. This group is now too solid for White to attack, so his only remaining target is Black's group on the side.

White plays 60 in order to set up the moves of 62 and 64, but Black counters with the perfectly-timed move of 65. If White cuts at 'a', Black will happily sacrifice two stones with Black 'b', White 'c', Black 66. This is not good enough for White. He wants to attack Black on a large scale, so he must keep him separated with 66 and 68.

Black 69 was the sealed move on the first day.

This move is obvious, but White's answer is not, as it is very difficult to decide whether to hane on top or underneath. White 70 seems to be correct, as it makes it harder for Black to get eye-shape.

White 76 is necessary. If White plays at 'b' first, Black will switch to 'd' instead of answering at 'a'.

White 80 is the vital point - White is now attacking in earnest.




Figure 3 (81 - 100)



Figure 3 (81 - 100). *The winning move*

Shuko was not worried by the attack, as he had prepared the combination of 81 and 83 to look after his group. White 84 was the move which Ishida regretted most in the game. Apparently he completely overlooked Shuko's reply at 85, for a momentary look of dismay appeared on his face when Shuko played there. Black 85 could be called the winning move.

Dia. 6. Ishida had expected Black to answer White 84 with 1 and 3 here, after which Black would be forced to eke out a paltry life with the sequence to 11.

Dia. 7. Instead of 84, Ishida should have played at 1 here. The continuation to 10 was worked out by the players after the game. This result gives White much more territory on the side than he gets in the game, while also securing his group in the centre. If by any chance it got into trouble, White would always have White 'a' in reserve.

Since Black lives with 85, White has to protect his weak point at 'a' by pushing up with 86 and 88, though these moves help Black. If instead of



90 he wants to try and kill Black, he must start with 1 in Dia. 8, but Black has no trouble escaping with 4. If White persists, Black shreds his attack with 8 to 14.

Black 95 is unnecessary to live, but Black is a solid ten points ahead on the board, so he decides to play safe. This wraps up the game.

Figure 4 (101 – 157). *Shuko forgets the finishing blow.*

White 8. An attempt to create complications which is calmly parried by Black 9. Answering at 'a' would give White the aji of 'b'.

White 10. Surrounding the centre is the only thing left to do, but there is no way that White can narrow the gap.

Black 31 takes solid profit but it also sets up the sequence from 37 to 43. White cannot resist Black 43 with 1 in Dia. 9 as Black can reduce





Figure 4 (101 – 157)

51: at 48


him to one large eye with 2 to 8.

When Ishida played 46, however, Shuko began muttering to himself. Apparently his original plan had been to play 1 in Dia. 10 instead of 45. The sequence to 15 sets up a ko in which Black has almost nothing to lose. After taking the trouble to work out this sequence, Shuko unthinkingly answered 44 at 45, so he addressed some bitter recriminations to himself. However, these were a luxury, for this slip made only a negligible dent in his lead. Since Black remained over ten points ahead on the board, Ishida saw little point in continuing.

This game was quite one-sided, with Black taking an early lead and improving it through superior analysis in the fighting on the left side. Ishida got into trouble by trying to follow a thickness-



8: at 5



7: at 4

oriented strategy quite alien to his usual style.

White resigns after Black 157.

Time taken. White: 6 hours 24 minutes

Black: 6 hours 6 minutes

Game Three

White: Fujisawa Shuko

Black: Ishida Yoshio

date: 7th, 8th February, 1979; Sapporo city

This game was the first title game in the history of the Nihon Ki-in to be started without an official referee or game-recorder present. The two players, accompanied by the Yomiuri go reporter and Kudo Norio 9-dan, who was doing the newspaper commentary, left Tokyo for Sapporo, on the northern island of Hokkaido, on the 5th, with the referee, Takagawa 9-dan, and the game-recorder due to follow them the next day. However, a heavy snowfall in Hokkaido on the 6th shut down the airport and stopped all the trains, so Takagawa and the recorder were left stranded in Tokyo. Since both players wanted to start the game at the scheduled time, Kudo had to be roped in as temporary referee and recorder, a dual role of which he was not relieved until just before lunch (at move 34).


Figure 1 (1 – 40). *Shuko-style*

Black 19. Black 'a'—White 'b'—Black 20—White 'c' is the accepted joseki, but Ishida was worried that if he then attacked at 19, White would just ignore him and play at 23 at the top right. Black could not be sure of capturing White 8 even with another free move on the left. Nonetheless, 20 is an excellent point for White.


White 24, a thick move which forestalls Black

24, is typical of Shuko's style.

White 28 is the strategic turning point of the fuseki. Kudo commented that this move would not occur to anyone else but that when Shuko played it, it seemed just right. The usual answer would be at 1 in Dia. 1, but White would play lightly at 2. The continuation to 9 is likely, but then White has a good move at 10. Ignoring this move would be dangerous for Black because of the threat of White 'a'.



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

Black 31. Simply jumping to 1 in Dia. 2 is usual. White can attach at 2 but sooner or later he would have to add another move to prevent Black from making a hane. The aim of 31 to 35 seems to be to build thickness (Ishida has commented on a number of occasions recently that he is trying to incorporate Otake-style thickness in his game), but when White secures his connection underneath with 34 and 36, Black's thickness is useless. At worst, his stones may just provide White with a target to attack.

Figure 2 (41 – 85). *Both sides satisfied*

White 44 is essential. If instead White moves out with the leisurely move of 1 in Dia. 3, Black will




Figure 1 (1 – 40)





Figure 2 (41 – 85)




invade at 2, reducing White's prime territory to nothing.

When Black reopens his attack with 47, White goes for central thickness with 50 to 54. Black 55 next epitomises Ishida's flexibility – this move is bad shape but it is worth a lot of points.

Black 59. Shuko apparently overlooked this move. White cannot try to save his stone with 1 in Dia. 4 as Black sets up a large ko with 2 etc. White only has two ko threats, and both of these bad ones, at 65 and at 'a' in the figure.

Black 67. Ishida regretted this move, as letting White capture a stone in sente with 68 to 72 was a bad loss for him (a ten point loss, by Ishida's estimate). Ishida commented that he should have played 1 in Dia. 5, letting White connect under with 2. Black's loss on the side is negligible, even though White can aim at playing a ko later on with White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c'. However, this result would make a big difference to the balance of power in the centre.



Black 73. If at 1 or 'a' in Dia. 6, White cuts off four black stones with 2 and 4.

Black 75. Black would dearly like to invade at 'b' at the top, but reinforcing with 75 to 79 is essential. The thickness gained by White with 64 to 74 involves a corresponding weakening in Black's centre position.

White 80 is equivalent to a declaration of victory. If the game were closer, White would play the more aggressive move at 'c'. Ishida commented that when Shuko played 80 he felt that the game

was still close though he was a little behind.

Figure 3 (81 – 104). The endgame begins.

With 81 the endgame has already begun. This kind of game – basically territorial, with no large-scale fight – should be right up Ishida's alley, but ironically it is Shuko who has taken the lead. However, Ishida's forte is playing a waiting game – when he falls behind he hangs on grimly, trying to wear down the opponent by denying him an opportunity to strike a decisive blow.





Figure 3 (81 – 104)

Black 81 is sente in itself but it also defends against White 1 in Dia. 7. Black cannot play at 2 as White counters with 3 to 7, so he would have to answer 1 by blocking at 4.

Black 99. Black is in a hurry to play this move in order to prevent White from playing 1 to 5 in Dia. 8. Black has to reinforce after White 5, which is painful.



Dia. 7

Dia. 8

Black 103. Played to prevent White 'a'.

White 104. Shuko took one hour eight minutes over this move. This is a crucial point of the game for White for he is ahead but not by much. White 'b' would take more points in the centre but would allow Black to encroach more at the bottom.





Figure 4 (105 - 133)
32: ko


Figure 4 (105 - 133). At long last the blunder

White 18. White should play first at 19, forcing Black 'a'.


White 32, capturing the ko, is the losing move. Shuko had completely overlooked the contact play at 33. He had been assuming that the best that Black could do here was to attack with 1 in Dia. 9. After the sequence to 8 Black can capture two stones with 'a', but White gets compensation with 'b', so he does not lose much. In the game, however, White loses 8 and 10 outright, with no compensation at all. This is an elementary slip as any professional should be able to foresee Black 33. Shuko is famous for these blunders or 'poka', which always seem to occur when he has a winning position. In the old days, before he became Kisei, he often used to comment that if you could have



Dia. 9



Dia. 10



Dia. 11

moves over, he would be the strongest player in Japan. Actually, however, these blunders have become rarer in recent years - the last major one that springs to mind was in the second game of the 1st Kisei title match.

Instead of 32 White should have pushed through at 1 in Dia. 10, then defended at 3. Black must play 4 to live, so White can take points with 5. Black does not have enough threats to start the ko at 'a'. This way White would have had a certain win.




Figure 5 (134 - 200)

ko: 44, 47, 50, 53, 56, 59, 62, 65, 68, 73, 76, 79

Figure 5 (134 - 200). A three-point loss

When you take White 36 and 42 into consideration, the damage from White's slip amounts to three points. According to Ishida, White would have won by 1½ points if he had followed Dia. 10. Since Black actually won by 2½ points, there is a discrepancy of a point, but this is accounted for by a further small slip by White. Instead of 48, White would gain a point by playing 1 and 3 in Dia. 11.

Now that he has no weak groups, Black is able to fight the ko with 41 and finally succeeds in making White defend at 80.




Figure 6 (201 - 231)

15: at 12; 20: ko above 17; 24: at 21; 25: ko at 17; Black wins and connects the ko.

Figure 6 (201 - 231). A lucky win

This lucky win by Ishida got him out of a tight corner and kept alive his chances in the title match. If he had lost three straight, most of the interest would have gone out of the series.

Black wins by $2\frac{1}{2}$ points.

Time taken. White: 6 hours 26 minutes

Black: 8 hours 20 minutes

Game Four

White: Ishida Yoshio

Black: Fujisawa Shuko

date: 21st, 22nd February, 1979

played at the Toyo Hotel in Osaka

Figure 1 (1 - 37). Ishida's controversial strategy

White 14. The first major problem point of the fuseki: White 'a' and White 15 are also possible, while Ishida also considered White 'c'. Shuko expected him to play one point higher, at 'd'.

White 18 is an interesting move. The usual response to Black 17 is to defend the corner with 1 and 3 in Dia. 4, but this gives Black ideal shape on the left side, while leaving him with an excellent move at 'a' which not only helps defend Black's territory on the right side but also threatens to scoop out White's base. Ishida did not want to give Shuko this ideal result.

White 26 is a slow-paced move. There is a strong temptation to connect at 1 in Dia. 2, but White is afraid of Black's cut at 2. White can get a ko in





Figure 1 (1 - 37)



Dia. 1

Dia. 2

the corner with 3 and 5, but Black simply defends at 6. White has to jump to 7, whereupon Black intercepts at 8 and should be able to get a good result here. If White 7 at 8, Black fills in a liberty with 'a' — finishing off the ko is a lot of trouble for White, so this would place too much of a burden on him.

The result to 30 gives Black a lot of points in sente and the overwhelming opinion among professionals was that White's thickness was not sufficient compensation.

Black 31. Shiraishi Yutaka 9-dan, the Yomiuri commentator for this game, predicted that while Black might play at any of the points 35, 37, 'e' and the three points one line higher, the shoulder-hit at 31 alone was out of the question. He therefore looked rather crestfallen when Shuko promptly played at 31, but after the game Shuko recognised that this move was too greedy.

Black 37 is a superb move which redeems his overplay at 31. This move completely astonished the professionals following the game and deserves a place in go history.




Figure 2 (37 – 57)

Figure 2 (37 – 57). Black's moyo strategy

Usually the only move that would occur to one for 37 would be defending against the cut with 41. However, White would then move through the centre with 'a', flattening out Black's moyo. If White tries to cut with 'b' after 37, Black will just give way with 'c', White 'd', Black 'e', White 'f', then surround the bottom area with 40. This would be a quick way to lose the game for White.

Black 39 stresses the side rather than the bottom. If Black plays 39 at 43, White will play at 'g' next, making miai of 'h' and 'i'.

White 40 is an excellent point for reducing Black's moyo. Once White plays here, defending with 41 seems advisable.

Black 45 was the sealed move at the end of the first day. An alternative strategy would be to reduce White's moyo with 'j'.

White 48. White does not have enough ko threats to play a ko with White 'k', Black 49 White 'l', Black 'm'.

Figure 3 (58 – 100). Shuko wraps it up.

White 58. This move is typical of Ishida's usual territory-oriented style, but Shuko commented that he was relieved to see Ishida play here (though not surprised perhaps, for before this title match Shuko went through all of Ishida's games for the last two or three years). According to Shuko, White's natural continuation after 56 is building up his bottom moyo with White 81. Black 'a' would be obligatory, so White 81 would also be a good forcing move.

White 60. It is still not too late to play White






Figure 3 (58 – 100)



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

81. Ishida commented that he could not make up his mind whether to play 81 or to build up the left side moyo with White 'a', so in the end he settled for the 'stingy' move of 60.

White 66 loses points. Dia. 3 would give White the same amount of territory as in the game but reduce Black by about five points.

Black 71. Shiraishi Yutaka had been expecting Black 'a', which of course would be a reasonable move, but Shuko wanted to settle the game at one blow. His aim is to use 71 and 73 as sacrifice stones in order to settle the shape at the bottom. It is this kind of middle game perception that puts Shuko in a class of his own. As Shiraishi commented, 'That's the difference between a first-rate and a second-rate player.'

Black builds thickness in the centre with 75 to 81, reduces the left side with 83, then takes profit at the bottom with 85. White cannot resist with 2 in Dia. 4, as Black lives easily with 3 to 9. The result to 87 puts Black ahead by nearly ten points. Shuko later commented that the game was over

Game Five

White: Fujisawa Shuko

Black: Ishida Yoshio

date: 1st, 2nd March, 1979; played at Nagoya




Figure 4 (101 - 177)

after 71.

Figure 4 (101 - 177). A well-deserved drink

Black 13. A small slip - Black could gain two points with Black 'a', White 'b', Black 14, White 'c'.

White 20. White 'd' is slightly better.

This game finished early, at 5.15 p.m. on the second day. The highlight of the game was Black 37 in Figure 1, but Shuko seemed to have the upper hand throughout. Ishida once again failed to display the tenacity which has won him so many titles in the past. At least part of the problem seems to be that his conscious attempt to change his style, to incorporate Otake-style thickness in his game, has so far met with very little success, perhaps because it goes against his natural instincts.

At the small party customarily held after title games, Shuko was seen with a cup of sake in his hand, his first drink since the new year. Shuko had sworn off sake for the duration of this title match, but perhaps after this one-sided game he felt that victory was safely within his grasp. In fact, he confidently predicted later on that if he won this series, he would be good for the first five terms of the Kisei title.

Incidentally, the players used exactly the same amount of time in this game, something which does not happen very often in two day games.

White resigns after Black 177.

Time taken. White: 7 hours 2 minutes

Black: 7 hours 2 minutes





Figure 1 (1 - 28)

Figure 1 (1 - 28). A new pattern


Black 11. A difficult point for Black. If he plays 'a', then after White 'b', Black 'c', White 13, Black 7 will end up too close to White's strong position.

White 20. Playing this move before attaching at 22 is a high level strategy. Black would like to hane at 1 in Dia. 1 in answer to White 22, but then White will counter with 2. If Black 3, White counters with 4 to 10, then pushes through at 12. Since he has good continuations at 14 and 16, Black would be dissatisfied. Instead of 3 -

Dia. 2. If Black 3 here, White settles his group.



Dia. 1 7: connects



Dia. 2

Black 23 is the proper move, though Ishida took forty minutes to consider all his options before playing here. When White plays 24, the result seems to be equal. This sequence is almost certainly a new pattern.





Figure 2 (29 - 51)


Figure 2 (29 - 51). A premature invasion

Black 31. The sealed move. Ishida was mainly responsible for the slow progress of the game, having used 3 hours 28 minutes to Shuko's 1 hour 19 minutes. However, play was actually suspended nearly two hours before the official finishing time on the first day of 5.30 p.m. This practice of sealing early has become quite popular recently, the aim presumably being to make the sealed move in a position with good aji, that is, not in the middle of a fight or where guessing an obvious sealed move would help the other player.


Most professionals would pick 31 as the sealed move, but another possibility, advocated by Go Seigen and Takemiya, is attacking violently at 36. The sequence to 4 in Dia. 3 would follow, after which Black would probably play 'a'.



Dia. 3



Dia. 4



Dia. 5

Dia. 6

Dia. 7


White 34 seems to have taken Ishida by surprise. Perhaps he expected White 1 in Dia. 4, in which case Black 2 and 4 drive the eyeless white group out into the centre. In view of White's counter at 34, Black should have played 33 at 1 in Dia. 5. White would have no choice but to play 2 and 4, so Black should be able to use his attack to build up influence in the centre.

Black 35. If at 2 in Dia. 6, White 3 to 7 could be expected. This result would be much better for White than Dia. 5. Black therefore decides to go all out for central thickness with 35 to 39, but this way White gets an invaluable sente to take the large point of 40, thus negating some of the value of Black's central influence. (Note that if Black attacks White's group with 1 in Dia. 7, White lives with a seki in the sequence to 10.)


Black 41. This invasion is premature, as the most urgent point on the board is 43. Black cannot permit White to play 43 as this would do too much damage to his central influence, as well as being a big move in itself. However, exchanging 41 for 42 before playing 43 is very bad, for once having made a move like 43 one must follow it up.

Apparently Ishida became worried that he might lose sente at the top, thus letting Shuko beat him to the all-important point of 43. The natural continuation for Black at the top is attaching at 1 in Dia. 8, but White has a strong counter with 2 to 6. The sequence to 12 is one possible continuation which clearly gives White sente.

White 44 shows natural fighting spirit - this



Dia. 8



Dia. 9

move punishes Black for switching horses in mid-stream, for he looks like losing 41 without getting any compensation.

Black 45. Trying to escape with 41 would be very dangerous, so Black tries to give it up on as small a scale as possible. However, White secures about forty points of territory on the top left up to 50 and clearly goes into the lead.

Black 51. Black cannot hope to overtake White territorially, so he must attack. A more conventional way to do so is with 1 etc. in Dia. 9, but Black does not want to let White get eyes for his group.





Figure 3 (52 - 100)

Figure 3 (52 - 100). *Avoiding complications*

Black 63. This is the move that Black has been aiming at for some time. If next White 'a', then Black 'b' and vice versa — whatever White does, his group will still be insecure, giving Black a good chance to try and engineer a double attack on this group and White's eyeless group on the right.

White 64. Another decisive move by Shuko — he prefers sacrificing the three stones on the left to creating two weak groups. White is ahead in territory to begin with and he gets considerable compensation by capturing four black stones with 78.

The alternative for White 64 is to try and save the stones on the left with White 1 in Dia. 10. Black will counter with 2, whereupon White makes a makeshift move at 3, then secures his other group with 5. The game will now be decided by how well White takes care of his group on the right. He has one problem, which is that 'a' or 'b' is sente against his group on the



Dia. 10

top right, but depending on circumstances he might sacrifice this, since it is smaller than his group on the bottom left.

The professionals following the game criticised White 64 and advocated following a strategy something like that in Dia. 10. However, Shuko commented later that he had a premonition of victory when he played 64, while Ishida agreed that the exchange up to 78 set up a win for White.

White 78. White 'c' would be better aji as White has to worry about the threat of Black 'c'. White 'c' would also give White the move at 'd' to aim at.

The endgame begins with 79. Black 83 is very large, as White 83 would be sente, threatening to live in the corner with White 'e'.

Figure 4 (101 - 150). *A close game*

White 8. This should perhaps be at 'a'.

Black 15. Ishida commented that he should have attached at 31 as this would have enabled him to dispense with 15, thus saving a point. That would




Figure 4 (101 - 150)

have made the game extremely close, though White would still have won.

Figure 5 (151 – 214)

There is nothing further to comment on in the endgame. Although the final margin was close, the result was never in doubt. This game was another convincing victory for Shuko. He seems to be the exception to the usual pattern, in that as he gets older his play is getting more solid and reliable, while losing none of its brilliance. If he keeps on like this, he could well establish a Kisei record which will not be easy for later players to surpass, just as no-one has been able to top Takagawa's record of nine consecutive Honinbo titles in the 1950's.

White wins by 1½ points.

Time taken. White: 8 hours 58 minutes

Black: 8 hours 59 minutes




Figure 5 (151 – 214)

114: ko; White wins and connects the ko

Go World News

Continued from page 4

Shang-ming. The next generation of Chinese players might be very strong indeed.

23rd European Go Congress

The 23rd European Go Congress was held from the 21st July to the 4th August at Konigs-winter near Bonn in West Germany. The main results were as follows.

European Championship

Three players tied for first place, each with seven points out of a possible nine. In a playoff Jurgen Mattern 6-dan of West Germany emerged the winner and will represent Europe in the 2nd World Amateur Go Championship. Second was Ronald Schlemper 5-dan of Holland and third was Robert Rehm 4-dan, also of Holland.

Main Tournament

The Master Group in the Main Tournament was won by Hendriks 2-dan of Holland, with Wirtz 3-dan of West Germany second and Bruce Wilcox 5-dan of the U.S. third. Fourth was Stefan Budig 3-dan of West Germany, who qualifies for the 1980 European Championship.

Weekend Tournament

1st: Zschintzsch 4-dan (West Germany)

2nd: Ciessow 4-dan (West Germany)

3rd: Pecenko 4-dan (Yugoslavia)

The above news reached us just as we were going to press. We hope to have a fuller report in our next issue.

New York Go Club

In August this year the New York Go Club moved to a new, more central location, at 41 East Fifty-Ninth Street, N.Y., N.Y. 10022. The president is Jerald E. Pinto.

Canadian Go Association Newsletter

The Canadian Go Association is publishing a quarterly newsletter with news items, go articles and members' ratings. It is available from the Canadian Go Association, c/o C. J. Elliott, 11625 -92 Ave., Edmonton, Alberta, T6G 1B4.

Kobayashi Chizu's American Tour

In the third extended instruction tour planned by the Nihon Ki-in this year, Miss Kobayashi Chizu, 1977 and 1978 Japanese Women's Champion, is undertaking a three month tour of the United States and Canada from Sept. to Nov. She will visit New York, Toronto, Washington, Edmonton, Calgary, Los Angeles and San Francisco.

First World Amateur Go Championship

Round Two Yasunaga v. Nieh

One of the most interesting games of the championship was the encounter between the iconoclastic Yasunaga, king of Japanese amateurs, and the Chinese strongman, Nieh Wei-p'ing. Yasunaga fully lived up to his reputation with a bold sacrifice strategy backed up by aggressive infighting.

White: Nieh Wei-p'ing (China)

Black: Yasunaga Hajime 7-dan (Japan)

komi: 5½; date: 14th March, 1979





Figure 1 (1 - 28)

Figure 1 (1 - 28)


Black 7 sets the aggressive tone for this game.

Black 15 is also aggressive. Black 1 in Dia. 1 is more peaceful, but White builds central influence with the sequence to 8. The continuation White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c', Black 'd' is also White's privilege.

Black 19. Black 1 in Dia. 2 is not good enough. Black's result is similar to that in the standard small avalanche joseki, but White's is much better.



Dia. 1



Dia. 2





Figure 2 (29 - 69)



Dia. 3

Figure 2 (29 - 69)

White 32. If at 53, Black would probably switch to 44.

Black 35 is a tesuji setting up the standard sequence to 43. White could also play 38 at 1 in Dia. 3, but after the sequence to 7, Black could build central influence by pressing at 8. Note that White cannot get a ladder with White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c', Black 'd', White 'e'.

White 44. This move is not necessary to live, so reinforcing on the left side would have been worth considering.

Black seizes the chance to force with 49 and 51, then makes a ponnuki at 53. Since this puts him in the lead, it seems clear that White 44 was a slack move.

Unfortunately, Black promptly went wrong as he made a miscalculation with 69. Simply forcing with Black 'a', then making shape with 'b', is best here. Black is threatening to take away the eye in the corner with 'c', White 'd', Black 'e'.




Figure 3 (70 - 113)
78: connects

Figure 3 (70 - 113)


White 74. White could also play 1 etc. in Dia. 4, though this leaves Black with an endgame move at 'a'.

When Black played 69 in Figure 2, he presumably thought that he could connect underneath, but instead White captures three stones up to 82, thus taking over the lead.


Black does not seem to gain much in his violent attack with 85. White simply discards two stones, then defends his weak point at 'a' with 96.

Black 97 is bad — he should omit this move and invade at 99 immediately. Black 97 is not only an outright loss but also aji-keshi. Without the exchange for 98. Black would be able to counter White's two-step hane at 102 and 104 as in Dia. 5. The threat of Black 'a' in the diagram would compel White to play 2 at 3.

Black 113 is the largest point, but the game remains favourable for White.



Dia. 4



Dia. 5





Figure 4 (114 - 150)



Dia. 6

Figure 4 (114 - 150)

Black 15. The conventional answer to 14 is Black 1 in Dia. 6, but this lets White settle himself with 2 and 4. Since Black is behind, this is not good enough — he has to attack more fiercely. If possible, he would like to contrive a double attack on this group and White's group on the right side.

White 28, 30. A standard tesuji for settling oneself. White is just about immune to attack after 34.

Figure 5 (151 - 200)

Black 55. Permitting White 60 is painful, but Black has no choice. If he blocked at 61, White would jump to 57, getting too far ahead.

White 58. Now it is White's turn to attack. Just picking up minimal profit from this attack will be good enough. However, Black keeps on playing all-out, attacking at 71 instead of simply extending at 80.

Black 83. This lets White put Black's large group into ko, but Black would lose anyway if he let White expand his centre any more.

Figure 6 (201 - 254), Figure 7 (255 - 306)

Black finally gives up the ko with 9 and 11. White is comfortably ahead, so he does not have




Figure 5 (151 - 200)
82: connects; ko: 91, 94, 97, 100




Figure 7 (255 - 306)
104: connects (left of 84); 106: connects (right of 58)




Figure 6 (201 - 254)
6: ko; 8: connects; 48: connects

to try to kill Black. This game was decided in the opening. Black went into the lead at one stage, but after his oversight with 69 in Figure 2 he did not get a second chance to win. Though he launched attack after attack, White had little trouble parrying them and thus held firmly onto his lead until the end.

White wins by 10½ points.

Round Three Ch'en v. Lee

White: Ch'en Tsu-te (China)

Black: Lee Yong-ho (Republic of Korea)

date: 15th March, 1979

Figure 1 (1 - 34)

White 8. The usual joseki with 'a' is preferable, as Black gets excellent shape with 9 and 11.

White 12. Too far - White should just extend to




Figure 1 (1 - 34)
32: connects

18.

Black 23. Defending with 29 is more urgent, as the ponnuki with 28 and 30 gives White excellent thickness.

Figure 2 (35 – 100)

Black 35 is the losing move. Playing here is reckless while Black has a weak group at the bottom. He must defend at 'a'.

Black 41. Necessary though it permits White to launch a severe attack with 42. If Black plays 41 at 51, White promptly cuts below 'a', capturing the group.




Figure 2 (35 – 100)




Figure 3 (101 – 160)




Figure 4 (161 – 229)

Figure 3 (101 – 160), Figure 4 (161 – 229)

The game was decided by Black's mistake in direction with 35 in Figure 2. This gave White the chance to set up a severe attack which assured him of victory.

White wins by $5\frac{1}{2}$ points.

Semi-final Ch'en v. Ch'en

This semi-final starred Ch'en Tsu-te, aged 35, for many years the top Chinese player until the emergence of Nieh. He came second in last year's




Figure 1 (1 – 47)

Chinese championship. His opponent, Ch'en Chai-jui, aged 25, works in the Canton city department of trade and came fourth in the 1978 championship.

White: Ch'en Chai-jui (China)

Black: Ch'en Tsu-te (China)

date: 16th March, 1979

Figure 1 (1 – 47)

White 18. White could also play at 22 or 32, but he does not want to let Black press at 18.

Black 21. Blocking at 2 in Dia. 1 is the joseki. After 4 Black can aim at 'a' or 'b'. Black's reasoning presumably is that since White has invested an extra move at 18, letting him take the left side is not unfavourable.

Black 35. A good move. The other common joseki move is 1 in Dia. 2, but in the sequence to 12 Black gets profit and White central influence. (Note that White plays 2 to defend against Black 'a' after 12.) The result to 12 gives Black profit and White central influence, which is bad for Black in this position. He therefore plays 35 to make the most of his thickness on the left. He is hoping for the joseki in Dia. 3.

Just for reference, the third representative pattern following Black's invasion at 33 is shown in Dia. 4. When Black has a lot of threats, he can set up a ko with 1 to 5.







White 36–40. White must of course avoid Dia. 3. Note that 37 is necessary to prevent White 'a'.

Black 43. Black 1 in Dia. 5 is another possibility, as the ladder at 'a' does not work.

White 44 is forced. If at 1 in Dia. 6, Black 2 and 4 put White on the spot.

Figure 2 (48 – 87)

The result to 53 seems favourable for Black as White has been split up into two weak groups. His



61: connects

invasion has been a success.

White has little choice but to play 54 and 56, though being sealed in with Black 57 is painful. White just manages to get two eyes but at the expense of giving up points on the side.




Figure 3 (88 - 130)

White 80 is not a very good invasion. Securing the corner by attaching at 'a' seems preferable.

Figure 3 (88 - 130)

White 90—Black 91. A bad exchange for White. He should simply play at 92, omitting 90; if Black then plays 93, White can make good shape and seal Black in with 'a'.

Black 95. If White 'b', Black 'c'.

Black 97 is a good point which establishes Black's lead.

Figure 4 (131 - 205)

Black 37 is a mistake, as Black 1 in Dia. 7 would gain two points. Since Black has to play at 'a' later, he hardly needs a stone at 'b'.

White gets some nice forcing moves with 40 to





Figure 4 (131 - 205)



Dia. 7




Figure 5 (206 - 265)

ko: 9, 12, 17, 20, 23, 26, 29, 32, 35; 37: connects (at 30); ko: 38, 41, 44, 47, 62, 65
Black wins and connects the ko.

44, but since Black gets sente to play 45, White's moyo does not amount to much.

Figure 5 (206 - 265)

This game was another well-deserved victory for Ch'en Tsu-te. The decisive factor in his win was the success of his invasion at 33 in Figure 1.

Black wins by 7½ points.

Final Ch'en v. Nieh

The final of the championship turned out to be an all-Chinese affair, though this did not come as a complete surprise. With the Chinese number one player matched against the number two, the final was equivalent to a replay of last year's Chinese championship.




Figure 1 (1 - 18)

White: Ch'en Tsu-te (China)
Black: Nieh Wei-p'ing (China)
date: 17th March, 1979

Figure 1 (1 - 18)


White 10 indicates a special strategy on Ch'en's part, as it is obvious that 'a' is more urgent.

White 16, 18. A new pattern. If White simply plays 16 at 1 in Dia. 1, Black invades the corner at 2. If White attacks at 5, Black has no trouble escaping with 6. Ch'en presumably wanted to avoid this result.


Black 17. Black 1 in Dia. 2 is also possible. After the sequence to 4, Black could attack at 'a' in the figure.

Figure 2 (19 - 60)


White 22 is a slack move, as White has the tesuji



Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3




Figure 2 (19 - 60)

of 1 and 3 in Dia. 3. White splits Black into two in sente with 5 and 7, forces with 9, then extends at 11. Black will have a hard time in this fight. In contrast, in the game Black is able to make the hane at 25, taking the pressure off his group.

Black plays cautiously with 43 to 53, but 57 is too solid. Black's corner is safe, so he could take the lead by extending to 58.

Figure 3 (61 - 100)

Black 61 precipitates a fight but perhaps there was a miscalculation on Black's part here, as the result is not favourable. Instead of attacking, Black ends up having to flee for safety himself with 77 and 79, thus giving White the chance to




Figure 3 (61 - 100)
99: ko





Figure 4 (101 - 152)
ko: 7, 10, 17, 20, 23; 25: connects



Dia. 4

take the excellent point of 80.

White 88. White misses a good chance to play 89, capturing the key black stones. Since 'a' and 88 are miai, White would not have to worry about his group at the top. This reprieve gives Black the chance to stage a recovery.

Figure 4 (101 - 152)

Black gets a strong, flexible shape with 1 and 3, while also threatening the eye-space of White's group.

Black 11 is based on a deep reading of the position. Black worked out the sequence from 12 on and saw that he could survive the attack.

White 22. White has no choice. If he connects at 1 in Dia. 4, Black counters with 2 to 8, capturing some of his attackers.

Black 27 is an interesting move. Black 29 and




Figure 5 (153 - 207)

31 make miai of connecting at 37 and attacking at 'a'. If Black just played 27 at 1 in Dia. 5, he would have no continuation after White 2 and 4 (for example, if Black 5 and 7, White strikes at 8).

White 32. Necessary - Black 'a' kills White.

Thanks to his clever move at 27, Black not only gets to connect at 37 but also keeps sente. This gives him a firm grip on the lead.

White 40. If omitted, Black gains seven points in sente with the sequence in Dia. 6.


White 52. Black 52 would be fatal.

Figure 5 (153 - 207)


Black 63. If Black played 90 in an attempt to capture White, his own corner would be endangered when White counterattacks at 71.

Black 107. If White connects, Black connects underneath in sente with 'a'. Resigning seems preferable to this, especially as Black is about fifteen points ahead on the board anyway.

White resigns after Black 207.



Dia. 5



Dia. 6

(Note. These commentaries were taken from a special supplement published by 'Kido' which contains all the games played in the tournament. It is available for ¥1,100, including seaimail postage.)


17th Judan Title

17th Judan Tournament

Winners' Section



Losers' Section



The Judan title is one of the more complicated tournament systems, or at least it used to seem complicated until the Kisei title came along. Every year sixteen players, made up of the eight players from the previous year who scored two wins or more, together with eight newcomers who have won their way through the elimination rounds, start out in the Winners' Section of the main tournament. Players losing a game have a second chance, however, as they move sideways into the parallel Losers' Section, though a second loss there puts them right out. The winner of the Losers' Section then meets the winner of the Winners' Section in a playoff to decide the challenger to the title-holder (in effect, this means that the winner of the Winners' Section is the only one who does not get a second chance).

Traditionally Kansai Ki-in players have done quite well in the Judan tournament and this year was no exception, with three Kansai Ki-in players, Hashimoto Shoji, Honda Kunihiisa and Sonoda Yuichi, all 9-dan, virtually dominating the tournament. Not completely, however, for one

Judan Title Winners

- 1st Judan (1962): Hashimoto Uтарo (Kansai Ki-in)
- 2nd (1963): Handa Dogen (K.K.)
- 3rd (1964): Fujisawa Hosai (Nihon Ki-in)
- 4th (1965): Takagawa Shukaku (N.K.)
- 5th (1966): Sakata Eio (N.K.)
- 6th (1967): Sakata Eio (N.K.)
- 7th (1968): Sakata Eio (N.K.)
- 8th (1969): Otake Hideo (N.K.)
- 9th (1970): Hashimoto Uтарo (K.K.)
- 10th (1971): Sakata Eio (N.K.)
- 11th (1972): Sakata Eio (N.K.)
- 12th (1973): Hashimoto Shoji (K.K.)
- 13th (1974): Rin Kaiho (N.K.)
- 14th (1975): Kato Masao (N.K.)
- 15th (1976): Kato Masao (N.K.)
- 16th (1977): Kato Masao (N.K.)
- 17th (1978): Kato Masao (N.K.)

Note: The title match is held early in the year following the official year of the title.

Nihon Ki-in player proved to be a major obstacle in their path. Ishida Akira 7-dan has also done well in the Judan tournament in recent years and this year he made his best effort yet. Although defeated by Hashimoto Shoji in the third round of the Winners' Section, he stopped the other two Kansai Ki-in players in the Losers' Section, after also polishing off Otake Meijin, and thus secured a return bout with Hashimoto in the playoff.

Judan Playoff

White: Hashimoto Shoji 9-dan

Black: Ishida Akira 7-dan

komi: 5½; time: 6 hours each

date: 16th February, 1979

Figure 1 (1 - 22).

White 22 is an excellent point, making good use of White's thickness at the bottom.




Figure 1 (1 - 22)

Figure 2 (23 – 71)

White 28. In this fuseki White wants to emphasise the right side, so blocking at 37 is not appealing. Black would answer at 'a', spoiling White's right side potential.






Figure 2 (23 – 71)



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

Black 29. The usual move of 1 in Dia. 1 would be just what White wants, as the joseki from 2 enables him to build up his right side moyo while also giving him a good result at the top. Black must avoid this. Ishida thought for ninety-four minutes, then attached at 29.

Black 33. A bad slip which handicaps Black for much of this game. Black must first hane at 36, that is, at 1 in Dia. 2, as this helps his eye-space in the corner. Black cannot play 1 after 4 as White will just cut at 'a'. White 36 makes a big difference to Black's corner.

Black 51. Answering at 71 would be more peaceful, but Black intends to start a fight by cutting at 61.

Figure 3 (72 – 100)

Black 73. The losing move – playing at 74, capturing the three white stones, would be worth




Figure 3 (72 – 100)

85: ko above 78; 86: connects above 84




Figure 4 (101 – 136)

26: ko

about thirty points. If White sealed Black in with 'a', he could live with 'b'. The difference in value between Black 73 and 75 and White 74 and 76 is enormous.

White 82. Connecting at 'c' would be dangerous because of Black 'd'.

Black 87. Black fell behind when White lived in the top left corner, so he has to do something desperate. White accepts the challenge with 88.

Figure 4 (101 – 136)

White 8. Taking this profit on the right side means that White can now afford to give up his six stones on the centre left.

Black's last hope is attacking White's group with 15 and 17, but White sets up a ko with 18 etc. and has too many ko threats.

Black 33. Necessary to defend against White 'a'. The weakness of this large black group has been a burden from first to last.

This was a short game but a fierce one. However, Hashimoto was on top throughout and well deserved his victory.

Black resigns after White 136.

17th Judan Title Game One

White: Hashimoto Shoji 9-dan

Black: Kato Masao, Judan

komi: 5½; time: 6 hours each

date: 7th March, 1979

Figure 1 (1 – 30)

White 20 is very aggressive and initiates some extremely difficult fighting. White usually plays peacefully at 1 in Dia. 1, whereupon Black reinforces himself with 2 to 8, then moves out at 10.

Kato: 'In a game with Rin I played 27 at 1 in Dia. 2 before turning at 3. The fuseki was different, but after the sequence to 16 I switched elsewhere. I thought that this was an equal result, but in the post-game analysis we looked at the variation with White 8 in Dia. 3. Black gets thickness, but White gets a lot of profit, so I had second thoughts about Black 1.'

Black 29 is a new move. Playing at 'a' would be more peaceful, but Black does not like White 'b', which next threatens White 'c'.







Figure 1 (1 – 30)




Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

Figure 2 (31 – 55)

White 36. White wants to play 39 but would have no answer to Black 'a'.

White 38. White could also cut at 1 in Dia. 4, but the continuation to 10 gives Black good thickness.

The sequence to 44 seems natural. White takes profit and Black gets outside influence.

White 48. This crosscut seems unreasonable, as White is handicapped by the fact that he cannot get any ladders here. Even if he exchanges White 'b' for Black 'c', White 'd' is thwarted by





Figure 2 (31 – 55)



Dia. 5

the black stones in the bottom right corner. Instead of 52, White would probably be better off playing 1 and 3 in Dia. 5.




Figure 3 (56 – 100)

Figure 3 (56 – 100)

White 62. White has to be very wary about doing anything in the centre as Black is much too strong there. From this point of view, White's invasion at 70 seems questionable as it helps Black to reinforce the centre further. Simply playing 70 around 'a' is perhaps preferable.

White 82, 84. These moves are probably better left unplayed as they just make White heavy and provide Black with a good target for attack.

Black 87. A clever invasion — Black is aiming at an attack on White's centre stones.

Figure 4 (101 – 151)

White 2. If at 'a', Black 18 would be severe.

Black 11. Attacking at 15 is also possible, but Black correctly judges that defending with 11 is good enough.

Black 25. Black gets his profit from attacking White. When Kato played here he felt that he had




Figure 4 (101 – 151)




Figure 5 (152 – 200)

81: above 78; 86: at 66; 89: at 69;
90: at 78; 94: at 66

the game won.

White 28. White must defend against Black 36.

White 40. To defend against Black 'b'.

Figure 5 (152 – 200)

Although White has saved his group, the game has already been decided by the fighting in the centre. However, White still refuses to admit defeat, battling on in the hope of gaining ground in the two ko fights.

Figure 6 (201 – 260), Figure 7 (261 – 328)

The decisive factor in this game was the skilful use Kato made of his central thickness which more than compensated for the early profit that




Figure 6 (201 – 260)
ko (at 3): 6, 9, 12; 60: below 57

he let Hashimoto have. For his part, Hashimoto made the strategic error of fighting on the battle-field selected by his opponent. The resulting pressure was a bit too much to handle.





Figure 7 (261 – 328)
ko (at 63): 66, 69, 72, 75, 78, 81, 84, 89, 92, 95, 98, 101; 103: connects (at 82); *ko*: 104, 107, 110, 113, 116; 117: *atari* (under 79, to left); *ko*: 119, 122, 125; 127: connects *ko*

Black wins by 6½ points.


Basic Fighting Techniques

Miyazawa Goro


This series is a systematic survey of the most important tesuji patterns and their application in actual play. These patterns are the basic tools without which one cannot hope for success in the middle game. One of the biggest problems is to know that there is a problem, to know that there is a tesuji to look for. We hope that a close study of this series will not only improve your grasp of tesuji but also develop your perception of the tactical subtleties of go. Before reading the article, test yourself by tackling the problems below. The same tesuji pattern is involved in each.



Problem One
White to play



Problem Two
White to play



Problem Three
Black to play

Pattern Two: The Placement

In this instalment we will look at the placement or 'oki' tesuji. Like the diagonal move tesuji, this move does its work on the first line, though its aim is usually to attack on the second line. This tesuji can often be a blind spot for weak players.





Illustration One: White to play


Dia. 1. White 1 is the tesuji in question. In this case White 1 also follows the proverb 'the 2-1 point is the key to life and death in the corner'. If Black 2, White 3 and 5 –



Dia. 1: the placement Dia. 2: Black dies


Dia. 2. If Black 1, White 2. This becomes 'bent four in the corner', killing Black unconditionally.

Dia. 3. If Black connects at 2, White 3 stops him getting from getting enough space to live. If Black 'a', White 'b'.



Dia. 3: Black dies Dia. 4: wrong

Dia. 4. If White 1, Black promptly lives by taking the vital point of 2.




Problem One: White to play

Problem One is a slightly more advanced application of the placement tesuji. White can take advantage of a defect in Black's shape. Given a couple of minutes, a 6-kyu should be able to solve this problem.


Dia. 1. White 1 is wrong – White has not even thought about the problem. Playing 3 first makes no difference.

Dia. 2. White 1 is just the move to exploit White's defects.



Dia. 1: failure

Dia. 2: the tesuji



Dia. 3: White wins

Dia. 4: no escape

Dia. 3. If Black 2, White comes down at 3 and Black is helpless due to his shortage of liberties.

Dia. 4. Resisting with 2 does not help – White gives atari at 3 and Black cannot connect. If Black 2 at 'a', White cuts at 'b', picking up six stones.





Illustration Two: Black to play

This is an important corner problem. Both sides have three liberties – how can Black win the fight?

Dia. 1. The hane at 1 is a common mistake. White's atari at 6 gives him enough liberties to




Dia. 1: wrong

Dia. 2: correct

win the fight.


Dia. 2. Black 1 and 3 are a clever combination – White is helpless.




Problem Two: White to play

Almost any move is good enough to live – the challenge is to live in style (3-kyu level).

Dia. 1. White has no trouble living with 1 etc., but this is a drab and uninspiring result.




Dia. 1: mediocre




Dia. 2: the key point

Dia. 2. An imaginative leap is required to discover the tesuji of White 1.

Dia. 3 If Black 2, White moves out with 3 to 9, achieving a resounding success.




Dia. 3: a great success



Dia. 4: standard

Dia. 4. If Black responds more temperately, with 1 and 3, White still gets a comfortable life with 2 and 4. Compare this result to Dia. 1.




Problem Three: Black to play


Black cannot hope to kill White but he can cause considerable damage.

Dia. 1. Black 1 destroys the aji of the position. If next Black 3, White calmly counters with 4.


Dia. 2. Black 1 here fares no better. Black 1 at 'a' is no good either, as White counters with 'b'.




Dia. 1: wrong



Dia. 2: wrong



Dia. 3: the tesuji



Dia. 4: wrong for White

Dia. 3. Playing at 1 first is correct timing. If White 2 and 4, Black splits White into two with 5, killing all his stones. In order to avoid such a disaster, White will have to play 2 at 'a', giving up his stones on the right.

Dia. 4. If White connects at 2, Black kills his whole group with 3 and 5. Compare this result to Dia. 1 and you will see why playing 1 before 3 is the correct timing.






Illustration Three: Black to play

Dia. 1. Attaching at 1 is too slow – White picks up the key stones with 2 and 4.

Dia. 2. The placement at 1 on the first line is the tesuji. If White 2, Black captures White with the combination of 3 and 5. White 2 at 'a' is no better as Black counters with 4.



Dia. 1: too slow



Dia. 2: correct


How to Improve at Fuseki (10)

Kato Honinbo

The Chinese-Style Fuseki (ii)

Countering the Chinese-style fuseki

The enormous popularity of the Chinese-style fuseki in professional go from the mid-1970's on put a lot of pressure on White to work out effective counter strategies.




Dia. 1


Dia. 1. In the last issue we looked at the pattern shown here. When Black has played the high move at $\blacktriangle$, Black 8, closing off the side, becomes an excellent attacking move. The result to 8 is adequate for Black. For his part White has to accept a slight disadvantage as Black started out with more stones in this area. However, professionals are by nature and by training greedy creatures always trying to increase their own profit. This can be seen in the strategies devised to cope with the Chinese-style pattern.

First, let's look at some localised tactics.

Dia. 2. This sequence, played when Black has made the high move at $\blacktriangle$, is one of the early josekis. White attaches at 1 for aji, then crosscuts with 3 and 5.




Dia. 2




Dia. 3

Dia. 3. Black 1 falls into a trap — Black is split into two by 2 and 4.

Dia. 4. Black 1 is just as bad — having one's stones ripped apart like this is terrible. Note that the $\triangle$ $\blacktriangle$ exchange proves to be very useful for White, as it prevents Black from playing 3 at 4, then cutting at 'a' after 6.



Dia. 4 5: connects




Dia. 5

Dia. 5. Since Dias. 3 and 4 are both bad for Black, he must pull back at 1. The sequence to 11 is a representative joseki in this pattern. White switches elsewhere, satisfied with having gained sente, but that does not mean that the result is bad for Black. (Refer GW6, p. 32)

Note that while White is anxious to play the forcing combination of 6 and 8, White 6 is not necessarily sente.


Dia. 6. In a position like this, when White has already played $\triangle$, trying to take territory at the bottom is not very meaningful, so Black could easily ignore White 1. One possible strategy would be to lay emphasis on the right side, forcing at the top with 2 and 4, then blocking off the side




Dia. 6

with 6. In other words, Black follows Dia. 5 when he wants to emphasise the bottom, but he has the option of following Dia. 6 if he wants to stress the right side.

Dia. 7. Black can also counter White's crosscut by thrusting up at 1. White must defend at 2, so Black takes the corner profit with 3, the opposite result to Dia. 5. After White 4 –



Dia. 7



Dia. 8


Dia. 8. If Black 1, White forces with 2, then runs along the side with 4. This sequence is regarded as a joseki.

Dia. 9. I have played Black 1 instead of 1 in Dia. 8. White will answer with 2, so Black can build central thickness with 3. The drawback is that White can play 4 in sente, then take a good point at 6 or 'a'. (For an example of this joseki, see GW7, p. 21.)


The sequences in Dias. 8 and 9 can only be played in the high Chinese-style fuseki pattern, as White obviously cannot run along the side when Black has played ▲ on the third line.

I have been referring to Dias. 8 and 9 as josekis, but I have doubts about their merit. In Dia. 8 White not only takes the good point of 4 but also pokes his head out into the middle, while in Dia. 9 Black builds thickness but at the expense of having the right side scooped out. I also feel that Black is somewhat over-concentrated in both diagrams. Therefore, instead of 3 in Dia. 7 –


Dia. 10. I favour simply giving atari at 1 here. Permitting 2 is a loss, but Black can play 5 and can also aim at attaching at 'a' after White runs




Dia. 9



Dia. 10



Dia. 11



Dia. 12

at 6. What is your opinion?


Dia. 11. Going back to the start, Black has the powerful counter of 2 when White attaches at 1. The idea of this move is to prevent White from attaching at 'a'. Black gets thickness with his ponnuki at 8, while White is satisfied with running along the side with 9. If Black wants to stress the right side, then instead of 6 –

Dia. 12. He can close off the side with 1, though this lets White force with 2 and 4. (Refer GW4, p. 16)

Unorthodox approach moves and erasing moves

We have looked at various strategies White can use to oppose the Chinese-style fuseki, but he is by no means restricted to the one-space high approach move. There are some unorthodox approach moves he can resort to, or he can look upon this pattern as a moyo and just make an erasing move. We will look at some of the strategies that have emerged during the Chinese-style fuseki boom. However, since the feature of this pattern is its flexibility, we cannot offer any definitive patterns. We invite the reader to take these strategies as a starting point for personal experimentation.


Dia. 13. White has taken the top and Black the bottom. In this position reducing Black's frame-



Dia. 13

work with 1 is quite a powerful strategy. If Black 2, playing 3 next is essential. If Black 4, attaching at 5 works perfectly, making the White 1 – Black 2 exchange work with 100% efficiency. Of course, it may be too optimistic to expect Black to play like this. For example, playing 2 at 3 is better for Black, though in this case White jumps in at 2. The point of White 1 is that it makes miai of 2 and 3.

Playing one space further in at 'a' instead of 1 is also feasible. The strategy is the same, making miai of 3 and 'b'.



Dia. 14


Dia. 14. In the same position the odd-looking approach move of 1 is also possible. Black must answer at 2, so White achieves his objective with the light reducing move of 3. If Black answers quietly at 4, White is in little danger of severe attack, so he can switch elsewhere. If he wants to keep on playing here, his continuation is to attach at 'a' in order to settle his group. Note that playing Black 2 at 'b' is bad as it permits White 'c'.

White 1 and 3 have been played by Sakata.


Dia. 15. Some readers may remember this position – it comes from the 4th game of the 3rd Kisei title match in which I challenged Fujisawa Shuko (see GW7, p. 34). Shuko played the light move of 1 to reduce Black's moyo. The aim of Black 2 is to keep balance with Black ▲. White keeps playing lightly with 3, ruling out any severe attack by Black. After 4 White could switch to 'a', though in the game he attached at 'b'. This was a questionable move, as I was happy to take profit with Black 'c', White 'd', Black 'e'.

Playing Black 2 at 4 is also possible.

If White invades at 4 instead of 3, Black makes



Dia. 15



Dia. 16

good shape with 'e'. White would then continue with 3, causing a subtle change in the position.

Dia. 16. In the previous three diagrams White aimed at lightly reducing Black's moyo, but it is also possible to plunge right into the moyo. The position here is from my 1978 Meijin league game with Cho Chikun (white).


White's invasion at 1 is a strong move which aims not only at reducing Black's moyo but also, if things go well, at attacking Black ▲. Simply jumping to 4 is not very satisfying, so Black first takes some profit with 2. In the sequence to 11, White has reasonable success in limiting Black's territory, but he is also still aiming at attacking the two black stones.

Someone expressed the opinion that White could begin with a probe at 11, followed by expanding his left side position with White 'a', Black 'b', White 4. This would also have been a


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Good and Bad Style


Problem: Black to play




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
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58




59




60


Vulgar style




If Black 1, White makes Black over-concentrated and gets ideal shape for himself.




Black 1 and 3 are a crude combination. Pushing from behind with 5 etc. only helps White.



The drawback of Black's play here is that White can aim at making a troublesome hane at 'a' later on.




If Black 1, White attaches at 2 and Black will later have to capture at 'b' when White plays 'a'.




If Black 1, White 2 forces Black into bad shape.


Correct style




Black 1 looks more promising.




Pressing at 1 is correct style.




Throwing in a cut at 3 is a clever strategy.




Black 1 makes correct shape.




The diagonal contact play is correct shape.




With 3 and 5 Black takes the corner and settles his group.




If White 2, Black increases the sacrifice to two stones and up to 11 succeeds in building up impressive thickness.



This way Black gets a nice, worry-free shape.



Black only has to add one stone, at 'a', later on. This represents a gain of three points.



If White 2, Black 3. If next White 'a', then Black 'b' and vice versa.

Professional Go Begins in Taiwan

This February the China Wei-ch'i Association, the official Taiwan go organization, accepted its first three professional players. Taiwan thus becomes the third country in the world, after Japan and South Korea, to have professionals.

The Wei-ch'i Association, which was formed in 1942 at Chungking on the mainland and moved to Taiwan with Chiang Kai-shek after the war, had already had considerable success as an amateur organization. Out of a total population on Taiwan of only 17 million, 600,000 — better than one in thirty — play go. Only 174 of these players are dan-ranked, but a 1-dan in Taiwan would play as an amateur 5- or 6-dan elsewhere. Taiwanese dan ranks go up to six, with about half a stone's difference between them. They are awarded on the results of a rating tournament held by the Wei-ch'i Association.

The Wei-ch'i Association also helps sponsor newspaper tournaments, putting up half of the prize money. This makes something of a contrast to Japan, where the newspapers not only put up all prize money themselves but also pay the Nihon Ki-in a handsome sum for the privilege of printing the games and commentaries.

Much of the success of the Wei-ch'i Association is due to the backing of the Taiwan business community, in particular to the backing of Ing Chang-ki. This remarkable man heads four separate manufacturing companies, but has spent a lifetime trying to perfect the rules of go. It is his rules that the Wei-ch'i Association now uses. He has also designed its elegant tables, which have the board set into a rotating top, with rotating drawers to hold the stones.

When the Wei-ch'i Association decided to start looking for professional players it set up three requirements. Applicants must be under 30 years old, must not hold any other jobs, and must have made at least steady, good results in the newspaper tournaments. Three people applied and were accepted: Chou Shen-han, 4-dan, winner of the 2nd through 5th Ming-jen (meijin) tournaments; Ch'en Yung-an, 5-dan, another newspaper tournament winner; and Ch'en Chulung, 3-dan. Chou was 28 years old and both Ch'ens were 27. By Japanese standards these are advanced ages at which to become professionals,

but two of the three are university graduates and all have put in their terms of compulsory military service.

As professionals, their duties include playing at least 100 games a year, on the basis of which they will be ranked into class A (60% wins and up), class B (40% — 60%), and class C (under 40%). They will also teach. The Wei-ch'i Association expects it can guarantee them just enough of an income to live on, exclusive of any tournament winnings.

The game below gives a sample of the level of play in Taiwan. The commentary is by Sakai Masanori, a 4-dan Nihon Ki-in professional. An explanation of the Ing counting system appears in the last figure.

Fifth Ming-jen Title, 2nd game.

Black: Ch'en Shih

White: Chou Shen-han

komi: 6. Played November 26, 1978




Figure 1 (1 — 47)


Figure 1 (1 — 47)

White 6 and 10. There is a sense in which the 6—7 and 10—11 exchanges favor Black, for later on White might prefer to have occupied the side instead of closing the corner. The ordinary move for both 6 and 10 would be White 12.

White 40. White 'a' is correct shape.

Black 41. The first of many aggressive attacks in this game, but somewhat thin, as White 42 shows. Black 'b' is the proper move.

Black 47 forces White to make an empty triangle at 'a', but this actually strengthens White. Black's real tesuji lies at 'c'. Probably he should play as in Dia. 1.



Dia. 1

Dia. 1. Black 1 and 3 prevent White 1, and then Black attaches at 5. If White tries to push past with 'a-b-c', Black strikes back with 'd-e-f'.





Figure 2 (48 - 101)

Figure 2 (48 - 101)

Black 59. Black overlooks a much stronger move, shown in Dia. 2.




Dia. 2

Dia. 2. Black 1 threatens 'a'. If White connects at 'a' or, better, plays 2, Black extends at 3, waiting until after White 4 to capture the cutting stones with 5.

Black 67 surrounds White's upper side and threatens 'a', hence White 68-72. The 68-69 exchange, however, would be best left unplayed. White would then have an angle tesuji at 'b'.

White 80 and 82 are overplays that let Black go on the attack with 83. For White 80, White 83 would have been adequate (if Black 84, White 'c'). White 82 should also have been 83.

White 88 and 90 are a well-read cut. Black would like to play 1 in Dia. 3, answering White



Dia. 3

2 and 4 with 5, but then White plays 6 and 8 and Black cannot get a good result.

Black 93. Black 'd' is better.

Black 95. Black 'e' would have more effect on the lower right corner (next Black 'f', then Black 'g').




Figure 3 (102 - 155)


Figure 3 (102 – 155)

White 2 threatens White 'a'. This threat also keeps Black from playing 5 at 6. That does not, however, make Black 5 correct. Just Black 7, leaving the possibility of capturing at 6, is better.

White 8. 'b' looks possible.

Black 9. Black would like to extend a line farther to 12, but apparently he considered this too dangerous. Since he has to go back to 15, however –

Dia. 4. Why not start with Black 1? Black 3 threatens a double peep (first 'a', then 'b') and if White defends, now Black can definitely extend to 'c'.



Dia. 4

Black 11. Black 'c' is stronger shape.


White 16. Good point.

Black 17. A vicious attack, but White has his defenses well read out. In retrospect, one can see that this would have been a good time for Black to probe the bottom left corner with 'd', or perhaps make a leaning attack against the center at 'e'.

White 18. Not good. White loses the potential of playing 19 himself.

White 24. White could capture three stones with 1–5 in *Dia. 5*, but at the cost of his main group.

White 40. Good probe – White seeks Black's help in moving his center group. Black 41 makes 42 natural. If Black plays 41 at 'f', White 'g' becomes good. White 40 plays a crucial role in saving White in the next figure.



Dia. 5

Black 43. Black should probe at 'd' first. Depending on White's response, Black 43 might then become much more effective.

Black 45–55. Black sacrifices four stones to mount an all-out attack on the center.





Figure 4 (156 – 216)

Figure 4 (156 – 216)

Black 57. Can Black push through at 68? *Dia. 6* gives the answer.



Dia. 6

Dia. 6. White 8 makes 'a' and 'b' miai.

Black 69ff. Black continues his attack, but White has him outread at every step. When White saves his group by capturing three stones in sente, the game is essentially over.

Figure 5 (217 – 293) (next page)

If this were a Japanese game it would end at White 74, but under Chinese rules the whole board is territory so play continues up till 93. White wins by 9 points.

Figure 6

This shows the Ing method of scoring. The players use all their stones (they started with exactly 180 apiece) to fill in their territory. For the komi, White is allowed to take possession




Figure 5 (217 – 293)

25: ko. 31 connects at 22. 66 recaptures
90 at 65. 91 at 62.

of three points (△) inside Black's territory. The
four stones that will not fit into Black's territory




Figure 6

are filled into White's (▲), each one represent-
ing two points of the losing margin. The vacant
point represents the ninth point of Black's
loss.
(Translated by James Davies)

1978 Canadian Open Go Championship

As reported in GW 11, the 1978 Canadian Open
was won by Se Ju Lee in a playoff on December
31 against Paul Selick. Their game follows, with a
commentary by Sakai Masanori, 4-dan.

Black: Se Ju Lee
White: Paul Selick
komi: 5½




Figure 1 (1 – 50)

Figure 1 (1 – 50)

White 6. Of course good, but the commentator


prefers White 50, Black 'a', White 7.

Black 15. Works perfectly with Black 1, 5,
and 7. That being so, White should have tried
to deny Black this move by varying the preceding
joseki. One suggestion: White 12 at 33, followed
by Black 'b', White 15, Black 'c', White 'd'.
Another suggestion: White 10 at 'e'.


Black 17 puts little pressure on the corner, so
the normal knight's move approach is better.
Better still might be Black 'f', White 'g', Black 'a'.

White 18. Good pincer.

White 22 should be 1 in Dia. 1. That defends
the corner better, and if Black cuts at 2, White
can fight with 3 to 9.



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

White 24. Bad style. This should definitely be White 1 in Dia. 2, forcing Black 2, after which White can attack with 3.

Black 29 threatens 'h', reducing White to one eye, so White should reply at 'h' himself. White 'h' is very large — next White 'i' etc.

Black 33. Just 35 is better. After 37 White has a possible ko at 'j'.

White 38. Since White's main framework is in the upper left, he should attack from that direction. White 39, Black 38, White 'k', Black 'l', White 'h' would be a nice sequence.

White 40. Not good, since White might want to peep from the other side later. Just 44 is correct here.

Black 45 makes good shape, another reason why White should not have provoked 41.


White 46. White should go straight to 50, leaving the option of playing 'm' instead of 46.

Black 49 should naturally be 'm'.

Dia. 3. After 3, Black threatens 'a'.

Figure 2 (51 – 100)

Black 53. Black correctly decides that grabbing two stones with 1 and 3 in Dia. 4 is not worth it, but Dia. 5 would have been the strongest attack.



Dia. 4






Figure 2 (51 – 100)



Dia. 5

White 54. No choice, but White is still not sure of two eyes.

Black 55. Black 59 — see Dia. 6 for a possible continuation. Perhaps Black wanted to trade 55 for 70, then play 59, but White upset that with 56.



Dia. 6

Dia. 6. After 1–8, Black can start probing the upper left corner with 9.

White 56. Good, especially now that Black has sealed the lower right with 51.


White 60. Runs right into Black 61. White should slide to 'a'.

White 62. Unreasonable; 79 is correct.

(Continued on page 57)


Practical Tactics and Tesuji

Rin Kaiho, 9-dan




Problem

Problem. This is the familiar attach-and-extend joseki. The book has White extending to 'a', but there is no rule that says he can't extend a line farther to 1, aiming to slide under Black's position at 'b'. What should Black do? If he worries about defending against 'b', he may never get another chance to attack White's over-extension.




Dia. 1

Dia. 1: correct. The time to invade is now, at Black 1. White can reply at 'a' or 'b', but either way he is in for trouble.




Dia. 2

Dia. 2: correct. If White plays 1, Black takes a large profit with 2 to 6, getting a good result. Descending at 6 is a tesuji.




Dia. 3

Dia. 3: failure. The hane at 1 is inferior. If Black carelessly answers White 2 at 3, White can make a ko with 4 to 8. Black can prevent this by playing 3 at 5, but that causes him an endgame loss. Black 1 is a bad-aji move.




Dia. 4

Dia. 4: correct. If White plays diagonally at 1, Black should cut at 2. White has no good reply. Neither White 'a' nor White 'b' works well.



Dia. 5

Dia. 5: variation. Abandoning direct responses, White responds indirectly at 1, but Black simply proceeds with 2 and 4. Although the triangled stone still has some potential, Black can hardly complain.




Dia. 6

Dia. 6: correct. Black can also invade on the fourth line at 1. One might protest that this lets White cross under with 2, but —


Dia. 7: correct. Black hanes at 1 and gives atari at 3. The result through 7 is about the same as Dia. 2, Black making a satisfying capture.

Dia. 8: variation. It is better for White to answer 1 with 2, but then Black can put the



Dia. 7

lid on him with 'a', or nip off a stone in sente with 'b', White 'c', Black 'd', White 'e'. This




Dia. 8

is an adequate result.

(*'Gekkan Gogaku'* Mar. 1979. Translated by J. Davies)

Shortage of Liberties

The game at right is completely over — there's not a point of territory left to be taken. All that remains is to fill in the neutral points (dame). But as that is done, shortage of liberties will force the players to defend inside their territories at various places. What places? That is for you to determine. See the hints below if you get stuck.



Hints

First hint: be sure to check out the following moves.


1. Top right corner: a white diagonal move.
2. Upper right side: a black cut.
3. Lower right side: a white cut.
4. Bottom right corner: a black diagonal contact play.
5. Bottom left: a white placement on the first

line.

6. Left edge: a black atari.
7. Top left: a white hane.
8. Center: a black cut on the fifth line.


Second hint: five of these eight moves work.

Third hint: answers start on the next page.



Dia. 1

Dia. 1. The neutral points have been filled in. Black has to defend at A, B, C, and D, and White at E. As is often the case, the defender has some freedom of choice. In the top left corner, for example, Black could defend at 'a' instead of A if he preferred.




Dia. 2

Dia. 2. These are the moves threatened. Details follow.


Top Left Corner

Dia. 3. If Black answers White 1 at 2, White 3 gives an immediate ko.


Dia. 4. If Black captures with 2, White gives atari with 3 and 5.




Dia. 3



Dia. 4



Dia. 5



Dia. 6


Dia. 5. That leaves this position. White 'a' (ko) and 'b' (life) are miai.

Dia. 6. White must not begin by giving atari at 1. Of course if Black captures with 2, White 3 makes miai of 'a' and 'b' again, but —


Dia. 7. Black will descend at 2. White has no continuation.

Top Right

Dia. 8. If Black blocks White's path with 2, White plays 3. Black's best move now is to attack from the outside with 4, but —




Dia. 8




Dia. 9

Dia. 9. White 5 starts a ko.

Dia. 10. If Black gives atari with 2, White just connects at 3. The rest is forced.



Dia. 10




Dia. 11

Dia. 11. White wins the capturing race by one move.

Left Side

Dia. 12. When White connects at 2, Black makes the contact jump to 3.

Dia. 13. Next come White 4 and Black 5. Black is threatening to drop White with 'a', so



Dia. 12


a ko is unavoidable.

Bottom Left

Dia. 14. White 1 threatens to cut at 'a' (see *Dia. 18*). If Black stops that with 2, White cuts at 3. Black connects at 4. The next move?

Dia. 15. White 5 is the tesuji.

Dia. 16. White 7 means a direct ko. The triangled stone does its job by keeping Black off 'a'.



Dia. 13

Dia. 17. What if Black plays the diagonal move at 2?

Dia. 18. White cuts at 3 and plays 5 — another ko.


Dia. 19. There are times when Black can parry White 1 with 2, but not here. After 3 Black is in even deeper trouble than before.

White 1 in *Dia. 14* is not an easy move to see. How does one find moves like this? Some explanation of the search technique may be helpful.


Dia. 20. White 1 is the obvious place to start looking. White 3 is the natural continuation, but after 4 White is stopped.

Dia. 21. How about the hane to the right for White 3? Does White 5 form a ko? No, because of Black 6. But if there were a white stone at one of the x's —


Dia. 22. Testing the first possibility, we try White 1, but Black can defend safely with 2 and 4.




Dia. 14




Dia. 15




Dia. 16




Dia. 17




Dia. 18




Dia. 19




Dia. 20



Dia. 21



Dia. 22




Dia. 23

Dia. 23. As we have seen, however, the second possibility works. If Black defends with 2, White cuts at 3, followed by Black 'a', White 'b'.


If you can start thinking in this way, you may suddenly find yourself getting a lot stronger. Of course a familiarity with basic tesuji patterns, like 'a-b' in Dia. 23, is a prerequisite.

Right Side


Dia. 24. This is comparatively easy. White 1 threatens 'a', and Black has to reply at 2. White 3 forces Black 4.



Dia. 24



Dia. 25




Dia. 26

Dia. 25. Next comes the throw-in at 5. When White gives atari at 7, Black cannot connect.


Dia. 26. These are the three moves that do not work. Can the reader see how to answer each of them?

Center

Dia. 27. White 2 is not the answer. Black makes a second cut at 3.




Dia. 27




Dia. 28

Dia. 28. If White protects at 4, Black gives atari at 5 and 7. In Dia. 27, Black 3 at 'a' also works.

Dia. 29. If White connects at 2, Black cuts again at 3. White cannot reply at 'a'. Black 'b' would make a snap-back.




Dia. 29



Dia. 30

Dia. 30. So White replies with 4, but Black easily steers him into a double atari.


Dia. 31. We have seen two white mistakes. White's correct move is the diagonal connection at 2. This defeats all Black's assorted cuts and ataris.




Dia. 31

Right Side

Dia. 32. White must not meet Black 1 with the atari at 2, because Black 3 and 5 are also



Dia. 32



Dia. 33


ataris.

Dia. 33. The tesuji is the diagonal extension at 2. White can answer Black 3 and 5 by connecting at 6, getting the full eleven points of territory.

Continued from page 34

a powerful strategy.

The discussion so far has been confined to cases in which White launches a direct challenge against Black's Chinese-style fuseki framework, but this of course is not the only approach. White may well prefer to counter Black's strategy by building up a moyo of his own. This is a question of individual taste — if you like moyos, then go ahead and turn the game into a moyo contest.



Dia. 17

(*'Igo Club'*, October 1978)

Page from Go History (Continued)


commissioner for permission to call off the series. Not only did he recognise that Dochi was entitled to play him on even, he also apologised for taking him so lightly.

'Ten years too late'


As related in the previous issue, Inoue Inseki cancelled his guardianship of Dochi in 1707. Despite this promise to Dosaku to see that Dochi became godokoro, Inseki contrived to have him-

Bottom Right

Dia. 34. Black 1 is a wicked move, but White answers it with 2.



Dia. 34



Dia. 35

Dia. 35. If Black hanes at 3, White counters with 4 and 6. There are other variations, but we leave you to read them out for yourself.

(*'Gekkan Gogaku'*, Feb. 1979. Translated by James Davies.)

self appointed as godokoro in 1710 and held the post until his death in 1717.

Dochi must have felt that at last it was his turn, but the heads of the other three houses procrastinated, avoiding recommending anyone for the vacant post. Dochi got tired of waiting and through an intermediary issued an interesting threat: if the other three heads persisted in their 'insincere attitude', he would 'abandon his previous promise and play in earnest in the castle games'. Dochi was of course the strongest player of the day, but it seems that he had been throwing some of his games. A look at the record shows that he always won easily with black, but that he often lost with white, nearly always by the margin of three points.

One is at a loss to understand why Dochi would do this, but at any rate it seems clear that in this period, the 1710's, the castle games had degenerated into a mere formality and there was no serious rivalry between the go houses.

Dochi's threat threw the other three heads into a panic. Since it was just before the 1720 castle games, they promptly capitulated, promising to recommend Dochi's promotion as soon as possible and pleading with him to keep his promise to make that year's game a jigo. Dochi was satisfied and duly played a jigo with the 5th Inoue. They took a 1697 Dosaku game which Dosaku had won by one point and after copying it for 146 moves, Dochi modified it to make it end in a jigo — all in all a rather strange episode of go history.

When Dochi became Meijin godokoro in 1721, at the age of thirty-one, he is supposed to have commented that the honour came 'ten years too late'. Nonetheless, he was the youngest Meijin of the Edo period.

Testing the Undefeatable Five-Stone Strategy

Miki Masa

1. Play an independent opening. Seize the big points.

2. Build a box-shaped framework.

3. Defend your own groups, then look for chances to attack. Combine attack with defense.

4. Modulate your play. After a cautious move, play a bold one. After playing a bold move, consolidate it with a cautious one.

5. Let your opponent have his way to an extent. Think in terms of letting him have territory somewhere.

* * *

These are the main points of an undefeatable strategy for five-stone handicap go developed in the first fourteen issues of *Gekkan Gogaku* and recently brought out as a book. To promote sales, someone had the bright idea of sacrificing the 'irascible' editor of *Gekkan Gogaku* to Sonoda 9-dan in a demonstration game.

'Me take five stones against Sonoda? That's ridiculous,' was my reaction.

'Not so,' said one of *Gekkan Gogaku*'s young staff-members. 'If Sonoda plays seriously, you'll need at least five stones.'

There was some justification for that remark. Last year Sonoda had driven Nishimura, one of the top five Japanese amateurs, to a three-stone handicap, and I take two stones against Nishimura. The match was on.

Figure 1 (1-27)

Black 2 and 4 implemented the first two points of the undefeatable strategy, building a box-shaped framework. Against White's double approach at 3 and 5 I jumped to 6, leaning against the stronger stone (3) to attack the weaker one (5).

Sonoda: 'White 15 was a mistake. I should have given atari at 1 in Dia. 1. If Black plays





Figure 1 (1-27)
20 takes ko

4 at 7, White gets good shape with the atari at 'a', so Black's best course is to play 4 and 6, then attack at 8. This may not be good for White, but it's better than what I actually did.'

It would have been a mistake to capture with 16 at 18. White would play 16 and get a flexible position. I had no fear of the ko fight, for it was my turn to capture first and, as the proverb says, there are no ko threats in the opening.

Playing Black 24 and then turning elsewhere is part of the undefeatable strategy. Through Black 26 I had followed this strategy with enormous success, getting off to a very safe start. From here on, however, I would be on my own. What to do next?

In the upper left corner two black stones, Black 24 and the handicap stone, were arrayed against four white ones. Should Black's two stones be viewed as weak or as light? The answer was 'light' and I knew it, but with Sonoda 9-dan for an opponent, somehow the idea of 'weak' got the upper hand. As a result, I had trouble in this area till the end of the game.

Figure 2 (28-48)

Black 28 was played without adequate thought.





Figure 2 (28-48)

Naturally I had foreseen White 29, but I had felt that since the circled stones were already a strong group and since the upper edge was open at 'a', White would be reluctant to play there.

Sonoda: 'White can't afford to omit 29 and let Black attack the three stones to the right with 'b'. Besides, the 28-29 exchange makes Black heavy. You should have played more lightly with 1 in Dia. 2, followed by 3.'



Dia. 2

So as not to become still heavier, I switched to 30, but this move did not relate well to Black 28.

If White had followed the joseki and played 37 at 'c', I would have turned at 37. Black 37 would work perfectly with Black 30 and the box-shaped framework to the right, but my opponent was not about to allow that.

Sonoda: 'You could have played 38 at 'd'. If White plays 'e', you cut at 38.'

I was worried, however, that if I played 38 at 'd' White would play 38, forcing Black 'f', then attack the upper left. The after-effects of Black 28 were still apparent.

Sonoda: 'You should have played 44 at 'g'. That would still let you invade next at 46.'

White had not yet entered the box in the lower right. Once he entered, I would know exactly what to do; the undefeatable strategy provided detailed instructions. I began to realize that one of the keys to making the strategy work is to play lightly and shrewdly outside the box.




Figure 3 (49-90)


Figure 3 (49-90)

Through Black 50 all I accomplished was to split White into two strong groups.

Sonoda: 'Black 54 was unnecessary. Your upper left was not in that much trouble. You should have defended the lower right with 'a', or else blocked at 62.'

Instead of peeping at Black 60, it would have been better to grip the white stone with 68. The same was true of 64. I was trying to attack on a large scale, but I was forgetting to modulate my play. The strategy called for me first to play cautiously at 68, then try an all-out attack. I realized this when I had to go back at 66, but it was too late.

Sonoda: 'Instead of 68 you should have played 1 and 3 in Dia. 3, leaving a ko.'




Dia. 3

White linked up in style with 67 to 73, but I got to play 72 and 74, which gave me huge influ-

ence on the right side. With these moves, I felt as if I had finally regained my stride.

Sonoda: 'White 77 and 79 were unreasonable. You could have demonstrated that by playing 80 at 1 in Dia. 4. After Black 7, the two white



Dia. 4

stones below 1 are dead and the other four to the right face a hard struggle. If White answers 1 at 3, then you can play 'a' (80 in the figure).'




Figure 4 (91 - 111) (1=101)

Figure 4 (91 - 111)

Sonoda: 'White 91 was a desperation move.'

Black 92 and 94 were good replies. With such favourable ground to fight on, I was quite enjoying myself. On the other hand, perhaps White was enjoying himself too with the thought that if he just survived this attack, the game would be close. Sonoda's expression was calm.

Sonoda: 'With 100, all you had to do was cut at 5.'

True, but I was bent on killing the whole white group. At five stones I was over-handicapped, and I intended to prove that fact for the benefit of the staffer who had denied it. I wanted to win by at least twenty points.

Still, to attack is good but to try to kill is dangerous. I had weaknesses on the left and lower sides.

Sonoda: 'With 4, it would have been better to cut at 5.'

I thought Black 4 would do the job more cleanly, but I was wrong. White pushed in at 7, and to keep him from making an eye on the lower edge I had to give way at 8, but that put me in shortage-of-liberty danger.

Sonoda regretted playing 11. He should have played 'a' instead. If he had played 'a' now I would have had to capture it with 'b', but after 11 the situation changed. This made a big difference later.

In attacking, the ideal is to attack two weak groups at once, or to attack and threaten to take territory at the same time. If White defends the group, Black takes territory. If White stops the territory, Black pounces on the group. Black 100 at 5 would have been that kind of move. This may be in part what is meant by the words 'modulate your play'.





Figure 5 (112 - 136)

Figure 5 (112 - 136)

Sonoda: 'If you had played Black 16 at 1 in Dia. 5, the game would have been over. There's no shortage of liberties on the right side. When White plays 4, you just dodge him with 5. Even



Dia. 5

if it gets cut off, your corner group is alive.'

In other words, White 4 would now be too late. That is why White should have played there with 11 in the previous figure, but I cancelled out his mistake with 16.

If White had played 27 at 28 his group would have been clearly alive, but he would also have clearly lost the game, so in full awareness of the danger, he played 27. Black 28 then killed him. Despite the difference in playing strengths, I was sure he would never live now. The 32-33 exchange held him to a half eye on the lower edge, i.e. after Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c' he could not link up with 'd' because of 32.

First taking an extra precaution at 34, I jumped to 36. Black 'e' would have been safer, but by capturing big with 36 I thought I might hasten White's resignation. His group really was dead. The game should have been over, a satisfying win for Black, but Sonoda played on with perfect composure while I let myself become agitated, failed to modulate again, made a simple mistake, and brought him back to life.




Figure 6 (137 - 191)
62 takes ko. 64 connects


Figure 6 (137 - 191)

Sonoda: 'Black 44 at 47 would have killed the group.'

I had overlooked White 47. I was expecting White 48 instead. White cut off the bottom left with 45, then played 47. Black jumped out of his seat. White 49 made one eye, and the three stones in atari and the lower edge were miai for

a second — a picture-perfect example of how to live.

Regaining my composure, I went back on the offensive and attacked the upper side with 50, but in a more rational mood afterwards I realized that the biggest thing was to save the lower left corner. That could be done with Black 1 in Dia. 6. If White insists on trying to kill Black



Dia. 6

with 6 and 12, Black captures him through 17 in a ladder.

Still, Black 70 killed the upper-side group, or should have.

Sonoda: 'If you had played 86 at 'a', you would have won the capturing race hands down.'

I was in such a hurry to play 86 that I never stopped to think about any capturing race. While I was working overtime to protect my upper-left group, White lived at the top and captured a large group at the bottom. I had let two dead white groups live and lost a group of my own that could have been saved. I really felt wretched.




Figure 7 (192 - 221)
110 recaptures

Figure 7 (192 – 221)

When the game was over, Black was ahead by six points. Never have I been so badly humiliated in a game that I won.

After trying out the undefeatable five-stone strategy, my feelings about it are as follows:

1. Play an independent opening.
2. Build a box.

These two points are relatively easy to put into practice. Many players at Japanese go clubs have already done so, for the most part successfully. One sees many games in which White gets into trouble.

3. Combine attack with defense.
4. Modulate your play.

These are basic principles in any game, not just a five-stone one. Putting them into practice is not so easy, but the player who can do so will probably enjoy a big boost in both self-confidence and winning percentage.

5. Let your opponent have his way, to an extent.


Outside the box Black is relatively weak, and this is where White will start fighting. Black has to fight back, but lightly, without expecting too much.

Subsequent moves omitted. Black wins by 6 points.

(‘Gekkan Gogaku’ June 1979. Translated by James Davies.)

Correcting the Mistake


Kato Honinbo



The Mistake

Three men were seated around a go board. Walking over for a look, I found them discussing the sequence above. Since three of Black's four moves are mistakes I was slightly surprised to hear him say, 'I thought this result was definitely good, but I went wrong somewhere afterwards. White played 1 to 7 in Dia. 1, and I'd hate to tell you what happened next.'

He did not tell us what happened next, but




Dia. 1


with the triangled stone and the ko, perhaps his whole corner group got captured. White did well to play the hane at 1. This is a hard move for Black to answer. Some players would clamp with 1 at 2, but that is less effective.

Anyway, after playing 1, 3, and 5 in Dia. 2 Black should have made the diagonal move at 7. That would prevent Dia. 1, and later Black could capture 8 in sente. And as for Black 1 and 3 in Dia. 2 –


White: 'I didn't expect you to cut. Black 3 in Dia. 3 is the tesuji. When I connect at 4 you can cross under with 5, and you won't have any problems later.'



Dia. 2



Dia. 3




Dia. 4

No problems later? What about White 'a', I inquired. Here the third man, apparently the expert of the group, spoke up.

'Black's tesuji in this shape is the attachment at 1 in Dia. 4.'

And so it is. He had hit the nail on the head. If White plays 3, Black plays 2 and White is lost.




Dia. 5

Just to make sure I asked him how he would answer White 2.

'I'd link up with Black 3,' was the reply. He seemed puzzled that I should even ask, but his Black 3 is actually a mistake because it leaves White the cut at 1 in Dia. 5. If Black resists with 2, White plays 3 and 5. This is not going to end peacefully. If Black gives ground by playing 2 at 5 he can avoid serious trouble, but this is a form of submission and it, too, has its price. Can't Black find an absolutely safe way to link up?

He can — the knight's move at 3 in Dia. 6. Now there will be no problems later. If White plays 'a', Black plays 'b'. If White 'c', Black 'd'. Black 3 is a tesuji that is frequently missed.




Dia. 6

Black 1 and 3 are correct on the left side, but it is worth noting that Black has another good move at 'e' on the lower side, which prepares for a hane at 'f'.

('Gekkan Gogaku' June 1979. Translated by James Davies.)

Joseki Amateurs Don't Know

Abe Yoshiteru, 8-dan




Basic Pattern


Basic Pattern. The small avalanche joseki is out of fashion right now, but it has a strange variation not given in joseki books that you might like to know. At times, this variation may be quite playable.

Black 5 after White 2 and 4 forms the small avalanche. White cuts at 6 and extends at 8, and here Black peeps at 9.

Dia. 1. Standard. Usually after White 1 and 3 Black turns at 4, leading to White 5 and 7. With a favourable ladder, however, White can play 5 at 6.



Dia. 1




Dia. 2


Dia. 2. Continuation. The triangled stone prevents Black 1 at 2, but Black still captures two stones with 1, 3, and 5 while White captures one with 6. The result is probably about fifty-fifty. This is the standard small avalanche, although for a time Black 6 in Dia. 1 was played at 'a'.

Dia. 3. Good for Black. But now Black has peeped at 2 instead of turning at 3. What should White do? If he blocks at 3, Black squeezes him with 4 and 6.

Dia. 4. Also good for Black. Connecting at 2




Dia. 3




Dia. 4

is bad too. Black forces White at 3 and 5, then makes a nice outer wall with 7. Even though White can capture two more stones (White 'a', Black 'b' etc.) he has the short end of the exchange.

Dia. 5. Contact jump. In an attempt to stop the outer wall White trades 1 for 2 before blocking at 3, but Black replies with the contact-jump tesuji at 4 (he must not cut at 'a').




Dia. 5




Dia. 6

Dia. 6. Good for Black. If White plays 1, Black cuts at 2. The outcome favors him again, and if White connects with 1 at 3, he is done for; Black links under at 'a'. The triangled tesuji should be remembered.

Dia. 7. Still good for Black. White 1 and 3 are worth considering, but Black captures a large corner with 4 to 10. His profit outweighs White's thickness by quite a bit.



Dia. 7




Dia. 8


Dia. 8. Good bad shape. It's starting to seem as if White has no answer to Black 1 but salvation

exists in the form of the bad-shape move at 2. This makes miai of cutting at 'a' and blocking at 'b'.

Dia. 9. Continuation. Ordinarily Black will stop the cut at 'a' with 3, letting White play 4. White has no complaints, at last, about the result through 7. His profit, in sente, offsets Black's outside influence.



Dia. 9




Dia. 10


Dia. 10. Bad for Black. Cutting at 3 when White plays 2 is unwise. With 4 and 6 White clearly gets an advantageous result.

(‘Shukan Go (Go Weekly)’ June 12, 1979. Translated by James Davies.)

Dia. 11. Containment. Black can, however, try a containment strategy with 2. White 3 to Black 10 are to be expected, and in positions where Black's center thickness works properly, he may have done quite well.



Dia. 11



Dia. 12 5: connects

Dia. 12. Squeeze. Against White 1 Black can also squeeze with 2 and 4, then double-hane at 6; this may sometimes be effective too. Anyway, the fact that Black can choose among Dias. 9, 11, and 12 is one attractive feature of Black 9 in the basic pattern.


Small-Board Problems

James Davies


Small go boards have three uses: theoretical investigations, teaching beginners, and practicing one's reading and tesuji. Here we are concerned with the last of these.

Small-board problems are somewhat like life-and-death problems, in fact, some of them really are just life-and-death problems. There are all kinds, however — counting, endgame tesuji, seki, ko, etc.

Problem 1. Black to play and win. These problems are set on 6x6 boards and are not too difficult. A good player should be able to read this one out to the end.



Problem 1




Problem 2

Problem 2. Black to play and win. This game appears to have ended already in a 9–9 draw, but it is Black's turn and there is no reason for him to pass.


Problem 3. White to play and win. He is

behind in board territory and has lost a prisoner but can still win.



Problem 3


prisoners : ○



Problem 4


Problem 4. White to play and win. The board is a little more open now.

Problem 5. White to play and win. This comes down to a choice between diagonally opposite 2–2 points.



Problem 5

prisoners: ●




Problem 6


Problem 6. White to play and draw. There is no way to win, but if White plays correctly he can at least avoid losing.

ANSWERS

1. **Answer.** The throw-in at 1 wins the game. When Black takes the ko at 3, White cannot connect. He has one ko threat at 4, but Black has one to match at 7. After White 12 the score is Black 9, White 7.




1. *Answer*
6, 9: ko. 11 at 1.
12 at 7.




Dia. 1
6: ko

Dia. 1: failure. Instead of playing 10 in the answer diagram White can make another ko threat at 1, but then Black gets another ko threat too at 4. White has to reply at 5. White can make one more small ko threat by playing next to 4, but Black will ignore it, win the ko, and finish five points ahead.

2. **Answer.** Black 1 is the invasion point. If White replies at 2, Black plays 3, threatening a snapback at 4. After Black 5 the position is a seki. Black wins, 9 to nothing.




2. *Answer*



Dia. 1


Dia. 1: failure. White can start a ko with 1, but he has no ko threats and gets captured.

Dia. 2: failure. By the same token it does not pay for Black to try to kill White with 1. He has no ko threats, either, and loses his invading force. That is why the answer diagram is a seki.



Dia. 2


3, 5: pass




Dia. 3

Dia. 3: variation. White can also reply with 2 here. After 5 the result is the same as before. Neither side can afford to start the ko, so the upper side is a seki and Black wins by nine points.

3. **Answer.** White 1 kills the black group in the upper left. If Black plays 2, White continues with 3 and 5 (or 3 at 5).




3. *Answer*




Dia. 1

Dia. 1: variation. Black 1 here is of no avail. White 2 and 4 kill him.

Dia. 2: failure. White 1 here would let Black take the key point at 2. White continues with 3, but after 4 he cannot connect and Black is alive.




Dia. 2




4. *Answer*

4. **Answer.** White 1 is the tesuji. Black must reply at 2, else White goes there and wins by a wide margin.

Dia. 1: continuation. Black captures at 4 and White descends at 5. The final score is White 9, Black 7, so White wins by two points. Note that if he played 5 at 9 he would win by only one point.




Dia. 1




Dia. 2

Dia. 2: failure. White 1 here lacks inspiration. After 3 the position is symmetrical and the game will end in a draw.

5. **Answer.** White 1 is the larger of the two large moves. If Black connects at 2 (his best reply) White gives atari at 3 and wins by two points. Remember that he has captured a prisoner.



5. *Answer*




Dia. 1


Dia. 1: failure. If White plays 1 in the lower left, a move that will appeal to those who like to capture stones, Black gives atari at 2, plays 4, and wins by one point, 10 to 9.

Although simple counting shows that White 1 in the answer diagram wins and White 1 in Dia. 1 loses, it is worth asking oneself why this is so. The reason is that White 1 in Dia. 1 is a dead-end move; after 2 and 3 White has no follow-up. White 1 in the answer diagram, however, is open ended; White has a follow-up at 3. The superiority of moves with follow-ups is a general principle.

Dia. 2: failure. If Black answers 1 at 2 to stop White's follow-up, White gladly takes the other large point at 3. Black gives atari at 6, but cannot afford to connect with 10 at 11 (because of White 10) and now loses by four points.




Dia. 2




Dia. 3

Dia. 3: variation. Descending at 1 gives Black the same result as the answer diagram, a two-point loss. He gets one more point on the bottom edge, but one less on the top.

Dia. 4: variation. The diagonal connection at 1 gives a similar two-point loss, and since Black has no ko threats he cannot, for example, get anywhere by answering White 2 at 5.



Dia. 4




6. Answer


6. Answer. The answer is the diagonal move at 1, a standard endgame tesuji.

Dia. 1: continuation. Black does what he can at 2 and 4, but White simply answers at 3 and 5. When Black returns to the upper side at 6 White gains a draw by connecting at 7. Black could reduce White's territory a point by playing 6 at 7, but then White would play 7 at 6, doing likewise to Black's territory and drawing again.

If White played 1 in the lower half of the board, at 4 for instance, Black could win by playing 1 himself.



Dia. 1




Dia. 2

Dia. 2: failure. White 1 here is a tactical mistake. Since Black gets to hane at 6, White comes out a point behind and loses the game.

Going back to problem 2, did the reader notice that the 3—4 exchange in the answer diagram is unnecessary? Black 1, White 2, Black 5 is enough for a seki.

(*Canadian Open — continued from p. 41*)



Dia. 7

Black 67 misses a chance. Black 1 and 3 in Dia. 7 would probably end the game. Living in gote with 73 makes a bitter contrast.

White 74. The upper side can live without this, so White should defend his weaker group by jumping to 79.

Black 77 turns out badly — Black loses a liberty and a sente move at 'b' — but Black redeems himself on his next move.

Black 79. White's right-side group is probably now beyond hope.

Black 83. Very risky. Black should make sure of his capture by playing 85.

White 84. Right on target. If White had played 86 at 'c', he would have captured five black stones.

Black 89. Thanks to the liberty at 'c' Black wins the capturing race by one move.

Black 91. Black 'd' is correct shape.

Figure 3 (100 — 152) (next page)

White 6 flirts with death. If White had played 15, securing two eyes for his group, he would have had excellent winning prospects. The same goes for White 8.




Figure 3 (100 – 152)

Black 11 and 13. Death comes. White 14 tries for a ko, but Black refuses to be drawn. Capturing this group with 15 and 17 puts him in the lead.

White 22 and 24. Very small, because if Black plays this hane and connection, White 'a' becomes sente. Black's lead widens when he jumps




Figure 4 (153 – 207)

96 connects above 68. 100, 103: ko.
107 connects at 90.

in at 25.

Figure 4 (153 – 207)

The official result was an 8½-point win for Black, but our counting makes this 9½. Perhaps White 106 is a mistake in the record.

(Translated by James Davies)





John Williams, longtime president of the Canadian Go Association, presents Se Ju Lee with the championship trophy.

How Would You Play Here?

Miyamoto Naoki

Problem 1. Black to play.


In 1949 the Yomiuri Newspaper sponsored a series of games between Go Seigen, then 8-dan and at the peak of his career, and ten other high-ranking players. The only one who managed to beat him was Kubouchi, 6-dan, his third opponent. The position at right is from their game with Kubouchi (black) to play. His move was one of the points marked A to D.



Problem 2. Black to play.


This problem is from a two-stone handicap contest. The middle game is under way and a little analysis is required. Which of the four points indicated should Black take next?

Problem 1. B is correct.



Dia. 1

Dia. 1. Kubouchi made the capping play at 1. This expanded his lower-side framework while making White's whole position on the left side thin, a perfect dual-purpose move. It would have been a good point for White, too, if it had been his turn.




Dia. 2

Dia. 2. A, C, and D are roughly 80 per cent moves. A is a good point, strengthening Black's corner enclosure and aiming for profit, but White will respond at 'a', after which it becomes difficult to reduce his left side.

C concentrates on reducing White's right-side framework. The trouble with it is that it has little connection with any of Black's frameworks.


It is too early.

D is large from a local point of view but slow from the overall standpoint.



Dia. 3

Dia. 3. Even if White plays the triangled stone, Black can push through and cut with 1 and 3, then link up with 7 and 9. This also makes Black 'a' sente; Black can keep that as potential and invade at 'b'. Black has other moves, too, so White is not likely to be in any rush to play $\triangle$.




Dia. 4

Dia. 4. Black 1 was praised after the game. White would have been forced if he had answered it, so he made probes at 2 and 4, then switched to the right with 6.

'I was actually somewhat grateful for White


4,' Kubouchi remarked later. 'It weakened the triangled stone.' Black 7 landed right on the mark, and the game was going well.



Dia. 5

Dia. 5. 'My first idea was to play 'a', but then I decided that Black 13 and 15 would keep me in the lead,' said Kubouchi. White would have liked to play 22 at 23, but then he could not have tolerated Black 24. Linking together with 25, Black got a very easy position. The final margin was four points in his favor.

Problem 2. B is correct.




Dia. 1

Dia. 1. Black 1 is the right move made at the right time. White cannot allow Black 2, so he plays there himself. Next come Black 3 and

White 4. Black's moves are locally forcing, and they have connections with two other parts of the board.

First of all, they keep White from cutting at 'a'. This cut is one of Black's main worries, but after 1 and 3 he can catch White in a ladder with 'b'.

Secondly, they threaten Black 'c' on the lower side.




Dia. 2

Dia. 2. Black 1 is a severe cut and there is no way for White to capture it. The triangled stones are breaking the ladder. It is unreasonable for White to try to save both halves of his divided group. Perhaps the best he can do is to jump to 2, hane at 4, and go back to 6, but Black turns outward at 7 and can expect a fairly large territory here. His bottom left corner is solid, too, so the thickness White builds up has no great effect.

Dia. 3. (next page) If it were White's turn he would play the knight's move at 1. This defends his lower-side group while expanding his left-side framework. If Black now tries to play 'a', White can counterattack with 'b', and Black has little chance of cutting successfully at 'c'. Black has to play 'a' before White can play 1.


Dia. 4. (next page) A, C, and D are all fairly good moves, but none of them equal the correct answer.

A expands Black's upper side and aims for an invasion of the left side, but it lets White play 'a' and fails to defend against White 'b'.



Dia. 3

C and D are profit-oriented moves. They are both good locally, but White will reply at 'a' and Black will have to work hard to win. White 'c' is



Dia. 4

not a serious threat. Black can answer it with 'd'.

(*'Gekkan Gogaku'* Apr. 1979. Translated by J. Davies.)

Page from Go History

The Endgame Classic

The 5th Honinbo Dochi (1690 – 1727) is recognised as one of the great geniuses of go history. He became the head of the Honinbo House at the extraordinary age of twelve, became the 5th Meijin of the Edo period in 1721 and was unchallenged among his contemporaries. He also excelled at shogi, reaching the level of 7-dan, and was the leading player of his day at Middle Shogi, a more complex, older form of shogi which was popular at this time. The drawback of Dochi's preeminence was that, with no rival to extend him, he played no serious go after reaching maturity, so all the drama of his career belongs to his youth. Perhaps, however, there was enough drama there, for at the tender age of fifteen Dochi became embroiled in a grudge match which produced the classic upset victory of go history.

Kamiya Dochi was born in Edo in 1690 and learnt go at the age of seven, entering the Honinbo school when he was nine. He seems to have been almost as remarkable a prodigy as Doteki; at any rate he became the last hope of Honinbo Dosaku, who had already seen two official heirs, Doteki and Sakugen, die young. Dosaku took a personal interest in his education and when struck down with a fatal illness in 1702, named Dochi

as his heir in his will. As related in the previous issue, Dosaku entrusted the completion of Dochi's education to his senior disciple, Inoue Inseki.

There has been a persistent legend that Dochi was actually an illegitimate son of Dosaku. The Honinbo school was affiliated with the Nichiren sect of Buddhism and in theory the players were Buddhist priests and so not allowed to marry, but this was not a puritannical period in Japan, so it would have been fairly simple for someone with the wealth and prestige of the Honinbo head to maintain a mistress. If Dochi were Dosaku's son, this would be a rare example of direct succession by blood in the Honinbo school. It would also go a long way towards explaining not only the 'unreasonableness' of Dosaku's deathbed request to Inoue Inseki but also the latter's ready acquiescence.

Dosaku died on the 26th March, 1702, and Inoue Inseki, who had left the Honinbo school to become head of the closely allied Inoue school, moved back into the Honinbo residence to take charge of Dochi's education. In July that year official recognition of Dochi as the 5th Honinbo came through from the government. Thus, in November 1702, a twelve year old 4-dan, bearing on his shoulders the full honour and prestige of a go house then enjoying its first great period of

prosperity, made his way to Edo castle to play his first 'castle game' in the presence of the shogun.

Dochi's performance in the official 'castle games' soon demonstrated that there had been nothing amiss with Dosaku's judgement. In his first game, playing on black, he defeated Hayashi Monnyu, 3rd head of the Hayashi school, by seven points. In his second game, in November 1703, he defeated Yasui Senkaku, 4th Yasui head, by five points, again playing on black. In his third game, in 1704, he defeated Hayashi Monnyu again, this time taking white, by two points. This was a most impressive start to a go career.

Problems arose with Dochi's fourth castle game, in which he was to play Senkaku again. Although Senkaku was 6-dan and Dochi still only 4-dan, Inoue Inseki requested Senkaku to let Dochi play on even instead of the normal handicap of black in all games. Inseki's reason was that Dochi had greatly improved since the last game between the two — for example, he was then playing Inseki himself, who was 8-dan, on black. Senkaku of course indignantly refused. Not only was he two ranks higher, he was, at thirty-two, also much older than Dochi, and in addition there had been bad blood between the Yasui and Honinbo houses since the Doetsu — Sanchi match (see GW10).

Inseki, then the senior figure in the go world, was in turn upset by Senkaku's peremptory refusal and so set to work in earnest. When a second request to Senaku, made by the 3rd Honinbo Doetsu who was living in retirement in Kyoto, was also refused, Inseki made a formal request to the government for a challenge match between Senkaku and Dochi. The government agreed to his request, but directed that Dochi should play as a 5-dan, that is, on the handicap of black—black—white. The series was to begin with the upcoming castle game.

The castle games, played once a year in the presence of the shogun, were the most important events in the go calendar. However, as play became more serious and so the games lasted longer, the practice grew up of playing the actual game several days before the official date, then replaying it more quickly at Edo castle.

The official date of the Senkaku—Dochi game was the 24th November, 1705, but play actually started on the 20th. Just before the game Dochi had been suffering from severe diarrhea and was in




Figure 1 (1 – 58)

such poor condition that Inseki thought of requesting a postponement, embarrassing though this would be. However, Dochi insisted on playing, so the game began at 8 a.m., with Inseki (who in effect had acted as godokoro since that post became vacant) in attendance as referee.

White: Yasui Senkaku

Black: Honinbo Dochi

date: 24th November, 1705

Figure 1 (1 – 58)


White 8 would now be played at 'a' as it ends up too close to Black's thickness. White makes a wide extension to 10, but 15 is a severe invasion.

Black 21 is well-timed. If played later on, White might connect at 32 instead of 22.


Black 39. Black could also connect at 49, in which case White 39—Black 55 would follow.

Black 45. Black does not want to play 46 as he is left with bad aji at 'b'.

Black 47. Until this point the game has been proceeding quite well for Black, but now things begin to go wrong. Because of the bad aji of 'b', Black should play 1 in Dia. 1. If the corner is solid, White can do nothing with Δ . This would



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

also give Black the threat of 5 to 9 for later.

This mistake handicaps Black by forcing him to play cautiously, for example, with 55, thus letting White's large group escape easily with 56.

Figure 2 (59 – 100)

Black 63. Black would prefer to play at 64, but then White could play the sequence in Dia. 2. Black would have to block off the top with 8, so with sente moves at 'a' and 'b', White would have no trouble living.

When White plays 64, he has erased Black's advantage from having the first move and might even be in the lead. From this point Black launches attack after attack in a desperate attempt to regain his lost ground.

Black 67 attacks White's base. The usual move at 79 would make things easy for White, as he would have the continuation 'a', Black 'b', White 'c'.

Black 77. Black 79 is once again the usual move, but Dochi has clearly calculated that it would not be enough to win.

Black 91. To prevent White 'd', Black 91, White 'e'.

Up to 100 Black's aggressiveness has had only limited effect – neither white group is completely alive, but then neither seems to be in much trouble either.

Figure 3 (101 – 156)

White 8–16. Not only does White assure his own groups of life, he also puts pressure on Black's large group, thus getting sente to take the large point of 18. This seems very late in the




Figure 2 (59 – 100)




Figure 3 (101 – 156)

ko:50, 53

game to be making a corner enclosure, but both sides have been too busy since the first fight started to play here. A win for White now seems certain.

White 20. If instead White connects, Black has a troublesome move at 'a'.

White 36 is a little greedy – 'b' is correct.

White 56 looks natural but has serious consequences, as Black is able to move out with 57 in the next figure. White 'c' is safer.

Figure 4 (157 – 222)

The sequence from 58 to 69 is forced. Instead of 70, however, making a ponnuki with White 71 is more urgent. White 70 looks big, as it sets up White 81, catching four black stones, but this would be gote. If White played 71. Black would




Figure 4 (157 – 222)

have to link up with 'a', so next White could play 110, destroying Black's chances of getting any points here. This would give White a certain win. Senkaku's lead must have made him so optimistic about the result that he forgot to exercise normal caution; he was seriously underestimating his opponent.

When Black pulls out his stone with 71, White's group at the bottom is cut off, so he has to worry about eyes again. That gives Black the chance to save his four stones at the top with 81. The game is now extremely close, though White is still in the lead.

Although Inoue Inseki was the official referee for this game, he had returned home at two o'clock in the afternoon. At that stage Dochi had had a lost game and Inseki was unable to bear any longer watching his pupil, still in an enfeebled condition from his illness, struggle on in such a forlorn position. In the evening, another Honinbo disciple watching the game also returned home and the two carefully went over the game. Not even Inseki, the top player of the day, could find any way for Dochi to stage an upset. In despair, Inseki tried to resign himself to defeat for Dochi. He had spent a restless night unable to sleep when towards dawn a messenger rushed up to the Honinbo residence with the astonishing news that Dochi had won. At first Inseki refused to credit it, but the news was soon confirmed — somehow Dochi had managed to snatch victory by one point.

Figure 5 (223 – 281)

Black 25 – 35. The tesuji that wins the game. The aim of Black 25 to 31 is to make the hane plus connection of 33 and 35 sente. White 36 is necessary to prevent Black from getting a seki in the corner (by playing to the left of 34). If Black simply played 33 and 35 first, that is, began with 1 and 3 in Dia. 5, they would not be sente. Once White has played 2, he can counter with 10. Dochi's tesuji thus gains two points by turning gote moves into sente. This was all that he needed to make the difference.

White 44 looks submissive, but White has no choice. He cannot resist with 2 in Dia. 4, because after 3 and 5 he cannot connect at 1. This would also give Black the option of 'a'.

Senkaku apparently believed right up to the






Figure 5 (223 – 281)

81: at 43; Black connects the ko.



Dia. 3

4: elsewhere



Dia. 4

end that he had kept his lead. He was so taken aback by the actual result that he is said to have recounted three times before finally admitting defeat.

Black wins by one point.

The second game of the series between Senkaku and Dochi was played in April 1706 and Dochi, in better health this time, crushed Senkaku by fifteen points on black. The ultimate humiliation came in the third game, played in June, in which Dochi took white, for he won this also, by three points. The shock was too much for poor Senkaku — he did not have the heart to go on with the ten-game series, so he applied to the go

Concluded on page 47

